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SHOULD OWNERS AND DEVELOPERS OF LowPERFORMANCE BUILDINGS PAY IMPACT OR
MITIGATION FEES TO FINANCE GREEN, BUILDING
INCENTIVE PROGRAMS AND OTHER SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES?
CARL J. CIRCO*

INTRODUCTION

Will green design and construction techniques pay for themselves
through the operating cost savings and premium values they generate?
If they can pay for themselves, why have so many state and local governments decided to invest in programs to encourage private landowners and
developers to adopt green, or sustainable, building and development practices?' What if the future of a sustainable built environment depends on
government's ability to provide increasingly costly incentives? While optimists will undoubtedly argue otherwise, sustainability proponents should
consider the dark possibility that the business case alone may never be
sufficient to achieve an optimum level of sustainability throughout the
construction and real estate industries.
True, life cycle cost analysis should ultimately prove beyond doubt
that significant capital investment in energy efficiency will pay for itself
over almost any building's useful life.2 Many other sustainable construction

*Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law. I am deeply indebted
to my former law partner, Stephen P. Chinn, a nationally recognized expert in land use
law, who practices in Kansas City, Missouri as the Chair of the Public Law Practice
Group of Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP, and who thoughtfully commented on several
drafts of this Article. I am also grateful to my colleague, Mark R. Killenbeck, Wylie H.
Davis Distinguished Professor of Law at the Universityof Arkansas School of Law, whose
insights and guidance on several key issues proved invaluable. Finally, Kyl Kirby, a thirdyear law student at the University ofArkansas School of Law provided research assistance
that was exceptional and efficient, and without which it would have been impossible to
sort through the details of many municipal ordinances and green building programs. All
opinions and conclusions expressed in this Article are, of course, mine alone.
' Benjamin S. Kingsley, Making It Easy to Be Green: Using Impact Fees to Encourage
Green Building, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 491, 532, 545 (2008).
2 See Charles J. Kibert, Green Buildings: An Overview of Progress, 19 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 491, 495 (2004).
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techniques will also return life cycle benefits in excess of their marginal
increases in capital costs over conventional methods.3 Modest upfront investments in efficient water systems and advanced landscaping designs,
for example, may produce offsetting operating expense savings.4 These
innovations, and others touted by the green building industry, can and
will gain acceptance among cost-sensitive and profit-minded developers,
building owners, real estate investors, and tenants, based on rigorous
cost-benefit analysis.5
But will cost-effective measures, as determined on a project-byproject basis, be enough? And will even a dramatic increase in the number
of green buildings transform the construction industry itself into an engine
of sustainable development? Should society be satisfied with improved efficiencies in energy, natural resource consumption, and emissions? Should
society demand more? Is the objective simply to have a growing number
of green buildings, as that term is popularly understood,' or is it to have
a sustainable construction industry, or even a built environment that supports and enhances, rather than taxes, the natural environment?
The amount of waste that buildings generate on a life-cycle basis
alone is enough to put the long-term challenge into sharp relief. New construction yields enormous quantities of debris; and renovations and demolitions of existing structures to make way for new development create even
3

See, e.g., BLDG. DESIGN & CONSTR., WHITE PAPER ON SUSTAINABILITY: A REPORT ON THE
GREEN BUILDING MOVEMENT 29 (Bldg. Design & Contr. 2003), availableat https://www
.usgbc.org/Docs/Resources/BDCWhitePaperR2.pdf (describing an instance where a $700,000
investment in energy efficiency resulted in an annual savings of $2,600,000). See generally
Gregory A. Norris, IntegratingLife Cycle Cost Analysis and LCA, 6 INT'L J. LIFE CYCLE
ASSESSMENT 118, 118-20 (2001), availableat http://simapro.rmit.edu.au/LIT/LCALCC/
NORRISLCCLCA2001.PDF (discussing more effective techniques for measuring the costs
created and avoided by environmental decisions of companies in choosing alternative
products or processes).
4 See Kibert, supra note 2, at 494-95.
'The question of whether the initial investment in sustainable design and construction
practices will produce offsetting savings in operating costs is invariably part ofthe practical
decision process on a project by project basis. See, e.g., Chandler, Ariz., Resolution 4199
(June 26, 2008) (this resolution was passed to encourage sustainable building practices
by adopting principles of Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design ("LEED")).
This is true in the public as well as in the private sector. See, e.g., id. The City Council
of Chandler, Arizona, for example, expressed this concern in a resolution that first specified
certain city building projects to be designed and built to recognized green building standards, but immediately qualified that commitment by requiring a payback period of ten
years to recover the initial costs involved. Id.
6 See Kingsley, supra note 1, at 534 (defining "green building" as "environmentally
friendly construction").
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greater waste burdens for a sustainable society.' Not only is construction
and demolition waste overwhelming in quantity, it often includes hazardous material, and it accounts for mounds of unrecyclables in dumps and
landfills.' Even if the current green building movement sufficiently addresses climate change concerns, construction practices will continue to
threaten future generations unless the industry as a whole makes enormous, long-term investments in sustainability writ large.
Before we can achieve a fully sustainable construction industry in
the broadest sense, we must envision buildings that will be as efficient and
environmentally productive as are natural ecological systems. Can we routinely design and construct buildings that generate more energy than they
consume, that incorporate recycled materials rather than newly expropriated natural resources, and that return to the environment only recyclables? And beyond even these near-utopian objectives, can we and should
we use building design and construction to serve the social justice objectives of the global sustainability movement?9 As sustainable construction
See MARA BAUM, GREEN BUILDING RESEARCH FUNDING: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT
ACTIVITYIN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2007), availableat http://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx
?DocumentID=2465.
' See id.
9
At the local land use level, popular approaches to green building incentives have not yet
extended to the most costly and controversial objectives of the global sustainability movement, such as those that aim to redress inequity in the distribution and control of the
earth's resources. See, e.g., United Nations Millennium Campaign, Goal#7Environmental
Sustainability,http://www.endpoverty20l5.org/goals/environmental-sustainability (last
visited Oct. 25, 2009) (identifying environmental sustainability as one of the goals that
should be achieved to eliminate global poverty). Nonetheless, the relevant background
literature reflects a concern for these broader problems, especially global climate change.
See, e.g., U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS CLIMATE PROTECTION AGREEMENT, availableat
http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/agreement.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
A close reading of green building program literature occasionally even reveals some local
empathy for the social justice motives of the worldwide sustainability movement. See, e.g.,
CITY OF PORTLAND OFFICE OF SUSTAINABLE DEV., CITY OF PORTLAND PROPOSED HIGH
PERFORMANCE GREEN BUILDING POLICY 2, 5 (2008) availableat http://www.portlandonline
.com/bps/index.cfm?c=45879&a=220879. Portland, Oregon's proposed plan, for example,
includes among its goals the objective to "[i]ncrease the number of local living-wage jobs."
Id. at 5. A statement from the Santa Monica, California Office of Sustainability and the
Environment includes human dignity among its guiding principles. Santa Monica Office of
Sustainability and the Environment, http://www.smgov.net/Departments/OSE/categories/
sustainability.aspx (last visited Oct. 25, 2009). And, along with the more customary concern
for resource conservation and public health, it proclaims that "[w] e live in a time in which
increased population growth, high levels of consumption and the desire to feed growing
economies have created escalating demands on our resources-natural, human and socialon a local, regional, and global scale." Id.
7
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comes into its own, these are some of the questions that policy makers face
as they adopt the green building programs and initiatives that will guide
development and construction for the future.
State and local governments are intensely interested in promoting
a sustainable building agenda for the private sector. 10 Moreover, the evidence suggests that governments across the nation intend to play a proactive, interventionist role in assuring that the real estate development
industry accommodates a sustainable future." One governmental route
toward sustainable construction uses green building codes and other legally
enforceable mandates to force the construction and real estate industries
to conform to sustainable development standards. 2 Given the influence of
economic analysis on policy decisions, however, it is not surprising that
command and control regulations of this type compete with more sophisticated, and, arguably more effective and efficient, economic instruments
13
to encourage the private development marketplace to turn green.
A few of the economic approaches use negative incentives to discourage undesirable practices. These techniques include disclosure requirements and taxes and fees assessed against low performance projects
and practices. 4 What has become more common, however, is a wide array
See infra Part I.
See Carl J. Circo, UsingMandates and Incentives to Promote SustainableConstruction
and Green BuildingProjectsin the PrivateSector: A Call for More State Land Use Policy
Initiatives, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 731, 754-55 (2008).
12 See id. at 732.
10

1s See id. at 762-65.

For example, as of January 1, 2010, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25402.10 (2007) will require
building owners to disclose to prospective buyers, tenants, or lenders specific energy consumption data for nonresidential buildings. Also, California's Environmental Quality Act
arguably requires environmental impact studies to address the effect that a proposed
project will have on global warming. See Dave Owen, Climate ChangeandEnvironmental
Assessment Law, 33 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 57, 59-60 (2008). Construction waste disposal
fees can be used as a negative incentive to help force projects'to internalize some of the
most significant social costs of building construction. See, e.g., SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY,
CAL., CODE tit. 4, div. 6, ch. 4, § 46.0401 (2009) (providing for separate solid waste facility
fees for construction waste). More aggressive approaches that extend beyond new development appear in such programs as Boulder, Colorado's energy tax on its residents to combat
global warming, see BOULDER, COLO., BOULDER REVISED CODE tit. 3, ch. 3-12 (2009)
(effective April 1, 2007), and in the San Francisco's Bay Area Air Quality Management
District's greenhouse gas emission fee, see SAN FRANcIScO, CAL., BAYAREA AIR QUALITY
14

MANAGEMENT DISTRICT REG. 3-334 (2009) (adopted May 21, 2008). Even more sophisticated economic instruments that combine positive and negative incentives may be on
the horizon in the fight for a sustainable built environment. See, e.g., SUSAN LINDEN &
MEREDITH J. KLEIN, MORE OFTHE GREAT GREEN HOPE: CALIFORNIA CARBON TRADING FOR
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of positive incentives that governmental agencies adopt to encourage green
building practices. 5 The positive incentive programs range from simple
informational and promotional campaigns, to development preferences
for green projects, to financial support for the incremental costs of green
building practices. 6
As more states and local governments implement green building
initiatives based on positive incentive models,' and as sustainability proponents work to expand the scope of the available incentives, 8 communities must decide how to fund or offset the costs of their programs. Even
relatively modest steps, such as public recognition and expedited plan review for green developers, involve administrative costs. 9 Rebate, reimbursement, and subsidized financing programs require increasingly larger
economic commitments.20 Additionally, some jurisdictions may wish to
finance programs specifically to offset the adverse impact of land uses that
do not meet sustainable development standards, such as low-performance
buildings.2 For example, a city might consider assessing a low-performance
building fee to raise revenue for rebates to offset qualifying costs that highperformance developers would otherwise reject as cost ineffective, or they
may choose to establish a long-term capital reserve fund to cover the anticipated costs that future generations will incur when traditionally built structures are demolished and their unrecyclable debris must be handled.

CLIMATE CHANGE IMPROVEMENTS (2008) (presented at the ALI-ABA Program on Clean
Air), availableat http://www.mofo.com/news/updatestfiles/20081203GreatGreenHope.pdf.
For example, in the future, building owners may see cap and trade permitting systems
for
such externalities as greenhouse gas emissions. Id.
, 6 See infra Part I.
, 6 See infra Part I.
17 See infra Part I.
18

See, e.g., GREG KATS ET AL., THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF GREEN BUILDINGS: AREPORTTO

CALIFORNIA'S SUSTAINABILITY BUILDING TASK FORCE 88 (California Sustainability Task
Force) (2003), availableat http://www.usgbc.org/docs/news/news477.pdf (recommending
that California ensure adequate funding for the design phase of green building projects).
" For example, a Scottsdale, Arizona program is based on positive recognition of participating builders and expedited green building plan reviews. Anthony Floyd & Edward
Peaser, Integrity of Green Building Practices into the Building Regulatory Process,
BUILDING SAFETY J., May 2003, at 35-36. All of the organizational and promotional
materials created by this program must be funded. Id.
'0 See, e.g., ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability USA, Municipal Energy Toolkit,
http://www.icleiusa.org/action-center/tools/municipal-clean-energy-toolkittfnancing (last
visited Oct. 25, 2009) (listing governmental financing programs to encourage clean
energy projects).
21 See infra Part I.
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Some programs already assess developer fees to support relatively
modest green building initiatives.22 This Article argues that developer
fees could be used more ambitiously to help finance the most progressive
sustainability objectives.2 3 The idea of using developer fees more aggressively to fund sustainable construction incentives raises important legal
questions. In particular, this Article examines the legal limits of developer
funding devices for sustainability, such as impact and mitigation fees. The
legal issues include constitutional limitations, questions about authority
for developer fee programs under existing state enabling acts, home-rule
authority and municipal charters, and fundamental principles of land use
law. The highly developed body of state law governing traditional development exactions and impact and mitigation fees provides a framework for
analyzing the issues involved.24
This Article addresses only a relatively narrow band of potential
solutions to the financing dilemma that sustainability presents. It is especially interested in analyzing the legal limits on developer funding programs pursuant to land use initiatives that rely on the police power, but
it gives only scant attention to approaches based on the taxing power.
While tax programs, especially those that take the form of excise taxes,
special assessments, and benefit district assessments, along with the related power of government to charge user fees, represent viable alternative means to pay for sustainability, they also raise their own host of legal
and political considerations." Although the immediate focus of this Article
remains on developer funding devices in the nature of impact and mitigation fees, policy makers must ultimately consider a far broader array of
potential funding mechanisms.
22 See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
23

For the purposes of this article, a progressive initiative reflects a broad perspective on

the proper relationship between the built and natural environments, and it aggressively
treats the effects of unsustainable design and construction as an externalized social cost
that public policy requires to be internalized by project developers and owners.
24 At a conceptual level, recently, the suggestion was made that impact fees offer an especially promising mechanism for governments to provide incentives for real estate developers
to embrace green building practices. See Kingsley, supranote 1, at 542-55. This thoughtful
proposal focuses extensively on the economic reasons that may make impact fees the funding device of choice. See id. at 542-54. The discussion of the potential legal barriers draws
attention to constitutional issues to a greater extent than it considers the other principles
that state courts apply to impact fees. Id. at 556-66. Such state considerations are a
principal focus of this Article.
5
See, e.g., McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 843-50 (Kan. 1995) (declining to
apply land use exaction limitations to a municipal fee to fund highway improvement costs
and rejecting numerous related challenges to the city's power to adopt the fee program).
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Part I of this Article reviews selected green building programs at the
state and local government levels that highlight the most significant policy
and legal issues of interest. Part II explores the constitutional doctrines
and controlling state land use law principles that limit governmental alternatives for funding sustainable construction programs. The conclusion
offers a few remarks for policy makers to consider as they craft effective,
efficient, and legitimate programs.
I.

GREEN BUILDING PROGRAMS AND THE POTENTIAL TO FINANCE
THEM THROUGH DEVELOPER FEES

The central question is: How will state and local governments pay
for their green building incentive programs? With that problem in mind,
this Part catalogues common program features based primarily on the
potential demands they make on the public purse.26 Additionally, because
this Article is also concerned with the popular and political support that
green building initiatives will require, this overview notes with special
interest certain factors that may make green developer funding devices
more or less controversial.
One preliminary caution is critically important at this juncture.
Governmental green building programs are still in an experimental stage.
This is particularly true of the municipal approaches that are of primary
interest here, which invoke local police power and land use control models
to influence green building practices in the private sector.2 ' New programs
and features appear regularly,2" and most of the programs discussed here
continue to evolve. Additionally, there may be significant differences between how ordinances and resolutions describe certain features of a program and how administrative agencies and planning staff implement those

26

For detailed information on many programs, see U.S. Green Building Council, LEED

Initiatives in Governments and Schools, http://www.usgbc.orglShowFile.aspx?DocumentID=
691 (last visited Oct. 25, 2009). Many of the incentives used to illustrate isolated approaches,
in this Part, are, in fact, incorporated into more comprehensive green building programs
that include many other features. See, e.g., id. The mention of one aspect of a program, in
this
Part, does not imply that the program is limited to that feature alone.
27
1 See, e.g., EVERETT, WASH., CODE tit. 16, § 16.13.030 (2008) (encouraging green development in the private sector through its "land use regulations, building codes, and development standards").
2 See, e.g., U.S. Green Building Council, LEED Version 3, http://www.usgbc.org/
Displaypage.aspx?CMSPageID=1970 (describing the features of the newest version of the
LEED green building certification program) (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
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features in practice.2 9 This Part does not attempt to provide a comprehensive survey or assessment of programs, nor even to cover all of the
significant features of any one program. The modest objective of this Part
is to identify some of the common features that best illustrate the important role that developer fees could play in financing some of the investment that sustainable real estate development requires. This Part covers
specific programs and features on a selective basis for this purpose.
The lowest cost and least controversial approaches are those that
merely draw positive attention to green building options. For example,
an ordinance or resolution might direct that municipal building and land
use regulations and codes should encourage use of the U.S. Green Building
Council's LEED standards. ° Another low key approach is to require that
permit applications for new projects must include a green building checklist
or must in some other way reflect consideration of sustainability.3 ' Similarly modest features use public awareness and educational campaigns to
promote green building strategies. For example, as one component of'their
programs, some cities disseminate green building information3 2 or sponsor
educational websites or other resources to make information available.3 3
Others offer awards and public recognition to projects that meet specified
green building standards.34
29

See, e.g., David Bolling, City Reacts to Water Supply Cut, SONOMA NEWS, Sept. 17, 2009,
http://www.sonomanews.com/articles/2009/09/18/news/doc4ab2db3elO83a978616859.txt
(describing a local council's disapproval of a planning commission decision contrary to the
council's intent with regard to an ordinance regulating the planning commission).
'oSee,e.g., EVEREIT, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 16 § 16.13.030 (2008) (mandating that the
city use "its land use regulations, building codes, and development standards" to encourage builders to use LEED standards). The U.S. Green Building Council's Leadership in
Energy and Environmental Design ("LEED') standards are the most widely recognized
green building standards in the United States. See generally U.S. Green Building Council,
About USGBC, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageID=124 (last visited
Oct. 25, 2009).
31 See, e.g., Fayetteville, Ark., Resolution 176-07 (Oct. 2, 2007) (providing for use of a green
building checklist). Checklists are also used to address compliance with mandated green
building features. See, e.g., Dallas, Tex., Ordinance 27131 (effective Oct. 1, 2009) (requiring
residential builders to submit a green building checklist covering such matters as water
efficiency and energy performance standards).
32 See, e.g., OAKLAND, CAL., OAKLAND MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 15.35 § 15.35.046
(2008).
33
See, e.g., Green County San Bernardino, About Green County, http://www.sbcounty.gov/
greencountysb/about-gc.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2009) (describing the "Green County San
Bernardino" program adopted by San Bernardino County, California); Green Hillsborough,
http://www.hillsboroughcounty.org/green/ (lastvisited Oct. 25,2009) (detailing the features
of Hillsborough County, Florida's "Green Hillsborough" program).
34See, e.g., Los ALTOS HILLS, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 8, ch. 1.3.05 (2009) (providing for
recognition plaques for residential projects that achieve LEED Platinum certification);
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These initiatives promote green alternatives at minimal cost, and
they are so nonintrusive that they should not generate significant resistance from developers and landowners. Yet, even these programs require
educational materials and resources, plaques and awards, or staff training,
and they impose some administrative costs for the time needed to assemble,
manage, and disseminate information, verify compliance with a new step
in the permitting process, or otherwise implement the program. 5 Additionally, resources must be maintained and upgraded periodically to retain value. And public recognition, if it is to be meaningful, requires at least
modest ongoing expenditures.3 6 Cities and other land use authorities operating under difficult economic circumstances might look to developer funding devices to support even these relatively inexpensive programs.3 7
A potentially more expensive but equally gentle method of promoting green building practices is to offer technical assistance for those who
wish to build green." Presumably, a useful level and quality of consulting
services or technical advice contemplates adequately trained and qualified personnel who are available to answer questions or review specific

NORTHBROOK, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 6, art. XV § 6-233(e) (2009) (providing for recognition on a website or newsletter sponsored by the city); ISSAQUAH, WASH., Bill No. 5229

(2008) (recognizing certain companies for their commitments to sustainable buildings);
Nashville, Tenn. METROPOLITAN CODE ch. 16.36, § 16.36.050 (2009) (providing for a
"green permit" to be issued to certain builders who comply with specified sustainable
design protocols).
35 See, e.g., WASHINGTON, D.C., D.C. CODE tit. 6, ch. 14A § 6-1451.07 through .08 (2001)
(imposing a fee on new construction and a small percentage fee on renovations and repairs to fund a Green Building Fund that pays staffing, outreach, education, and incentive
program expenses).
" For example, NORTHBROOK, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 6, art. XV, § 6-233 (2009), must
pay printing costs and website maintenance fees for the website and newsletter through
which Northbrook recognizes green building success.
" For example, in Arlington County, Virginia projects pay a fee ($0.045 per square foot
of gross floor area) to fund the county's green building fund for educational purposes, and
developers that achieve LEED certification are eligible for a refund of that fee. Arlington
County, Va., County Board Agenda Item Meeting of March 14, 2009: Green Building
Density Incentive Policy for Site Plan Projects 2 (Feb. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Arlington
Board Meeting of March 14, 2009], available at http://www.co.arlington.va.us/
departments/EnvironmentalServices/epo/PDFfles/file69951.pdf.
38
See, e.g., OAKLAND, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 15.35, § 15.35.046 (2008); WASHINGTON,
D.C., D.C. CODE tit. 6, ch. 14A, §§ 6-1451.07,6-1451.09 (2001). See also CITY OF ISSAQUAH
RESOURCE CONSERVATION OFFICE, 2009 SUSTAINABLE BUILDING INCENTIVES FOR
COMMERcIALBUILDINGS 2 (2009) http://www.ci.issaquah.wa.us/Files/Issaquah %202009
%20Sust%20Incentives,%20Commercial.pdf (stating that Issaquah, Washington's
sustainable building program offers "free [s]ustainable [d]evelopment [c]onsultations").
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projects. A municipality may need a dedicated funding source to pay for
such specialized professional services. How would the development
community react to a surcharge added to existing permitting and development fees to cover the salary and expenses of a local office of
sustainability consultant?
A growing number of municipalities and development agencies have
recently taken their green building programs to levels that may require
substantial staff and administrative resources. One of the most common
of these more costly approaches offers preferences in the project review
and permitting processes to reward developers who voluntarily build to
established green building standards. Currently, several programs, including some in major markets, provide expedited plan review for green
projects.3 9 These programs promise a developer who adopts specified standards or who commits to obtain a recognized green building certification
that at least some aspect of the development permit application will be
processed more quickly than those submitted by traditional developers.4 °
Because development preference programs typically reference technical
design and construction standards, they require review and monitoring procedures managed by qualified professionals who can confirm compliance
with the program requirements. 4 ' Some jurisdictions require a developer
who wishes to receive green building incentives to enter into an agreement
covering the green features the developer promises, and may also require
the developer to provide a bond to assure performance.4 2 As an additional
39

See, e.g., LOS ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 1, art. 6.1, § 16.10(E) (2009); MIAMIDADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 8, art. I, § 8-6 (2009); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.,
CAMPAIGNAND GOVERNMENT CONDUCT CODE art. III, ch. 4, § 3.400 (2009); San Francisco,
Cal., Director's Bulletin No. 2006-02 (San Francisco Planning Dep't Sept. 28, 2006); San
Francisco, Cal. Administrative Bulletin AB-004, 1-3 (200) (finding the "compelling public
policy basis" necessary to expedite permits for sustainable development) (updated 2008);
VENTURA, CAL., BUILDING CODE ch. 44, § 44.1 (2007); WASHINGTON, D.C. STAT. tit. 6, ch.

14A, §§ 6-1451.06 though .07 (2001).

40 See sources cited supra note 39.
4' For example, Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 1, art 6.1,

§ 16.10 (2009)

provides for administration by a "Green Building Team," and requires that applicants for
expedited processing provide special documentation for advance review, and that a LEED
Accredited Professional review and approve the project's plans before a building permit
may be issued. See also infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
42 See, e.g., WASHINGTON, D.C., D.C. CODE. tit. 6 ch. 14A, § 6-1451.05 (2001)
(requiring
that a builder provide a performance bond when the first building permit is approved);
WASHINGTON, D.C., D.C. CODE, tit. 6, ch. 14A, § 6-1451.06 (2001) (creating incentives for
green builders); San Francisco, Cal., Director's Bulletin No. 2006-02, at 3 (San Francisco
Planning Dep't Sept. 28, 2006) (requiring a builder to provide a LEED checklist, a process-
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or alternative process, a jurisdiction may offer expedited inspection for
the completed project.4" In other words, the program may provide expedited procedures at the certificate of occupancy stage rather than (or in
addition to) at the plan review or permitting stage." Presumably, an advantage of expediting the process only at the certificate of occupancy stage is
that it only provides an advantage to a developer who delivers the required
green features. But in jurisdictions in which the most significant processing delays involve the initial project approval rather than final permitting, expediting the certificate of occupancy process will hold much less
attraction for developers.
Expedited review programs present several challenges that may
ultimately make them less effective, relatively expensive to administer, or
impractical to maintain over time.4" First, they require adequately trained
professionals to assure compliance with the program's requirements."
Second, they are only valuable to the extent that the reduced processing
time has sufficient value to encourage developers to incur the additional
costs of sustainable design and construction for the benefit of being placed
in a special processing line.47 While the development approval (or certificate
ing fee, and to sign an agreement delineating applicant's obligations for approval).
" See, e.g., WASHINGTON, D.C., D.C. CODE tit. 6, ch. 14A, § 6-1451.06 (2001) (dedicating
an inspector for green building projects).
44 Because LEED certification comes only after project completion, Green Building
Certification Inst., LEED 2009 Minimum Program Requirements, http://www.gbci.org/
DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageID=130 (last visited Oct. 25, 2009), an expedited review
program may require a careful, professional review of designs and construction plans to
determine in advance that the completed project will satisfy the certification standards,
see, e.g., LOS ANGELES, CAL. MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 1, art. 6.1, § 16.10 (2009) (requiring

review of construction plans by a LEED Accredited Professional). To assure compliance
or to implement any enforcement technique (such as forfeiture of a bond), some administrative process may be necessary after construction is complete, which may become part
of the certificate of occupancy process.
45
See, e.g., WASHINGTON, D.C., D.C. CODE tit. 6, ch. 14A, § 6-1451.05 through .06 (2001)
(specifying that a bond be held to assure compliance with standards and that bond proceeds
to the "Green Building Fund" if the project fails standards).
are
46 to be applied
Id. § 6-1451.06 (assigning three specialized employees to have primary responsibility
for expediting green building permits).
4
It is impossible to judge the significance of expedited review without gathering empirical
data. While many programs promise expedited review without indicating how much time
the expedited process can save, the terms of one program, in Chandler, Arizona, demonstrate that the time saved will not necessarily create a powerful incentive in every instance.
See CHANDLER, ARIZ., RES. 4199 ex. A, at 4-8 (June 26, 2008). The resolution provides
extensive requirements for expedited review applications, imposes limitations on the
availability of the expedited process, and explains that projects granted the special status
will receive plan review within ten days rather than within twenty days, which is
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of occupancy) process in many places involves extensive delays, in others
the normal process may be efficient enough to minimize the value of expedited review. 48 And for some projects, the complete permitting process
may involve many different governmental agencies, not all of which participate in the expedited process.4 9 What is more important is that expedited
processing may itself prove to be an unsustainable practice (or at least it
may not be self-sustaining). The more effective expedited review is, the
more projects will apply for the expedited process, which will either slow
down the processing time or require investment in additional staff to keep
the expedited projects moving significantly faster than the regular ones.5 °
Another extremely popular development preference is to reduce
permitting fees or to offer rebates of certain development fees for green
projects.5 ' These programs not only require resources for the additional
staff time and professional expertise to administer them, but they also involve the additional financial costs of foregone or rebated fees." Because53
few municipalities and land use agencies can afford to give up revenue,

represented as the standard plan review time in Chandler. Id.
48 See, e.g., Colorado State Univ., Real Estate Study Reveals Major Differences Across

Cities, Counties in First-of-Its-KindFrontRange Study, Mar. 25, 2009, http://www.today
.colostate.edulstory.aspx?id=1007 (indicating that commercial building permit approval
times range from three days to ten weeks in various Colorado cities and counties).
41 See Jonathan Riker, Green Building Requirements Must Strike a Balance between
Market Economics and Social Needs, L.A. LAWYER, Jan. 2008, at 27.
50 See, e.g., CHANDLER, ARIZ., supra note 47, at 5-6. The Chandler, Arizona program
recognizes this limitation by reserving the right to the City's Planning and Development
Director to deny expedited plan review if the number of applications for expedited plan
review overburdens the staffs ability to complete expedited reviews and to process other
applications. Id.
"' See, e.g., Arlington Board Meeting of March 14, 2009, supra note 37, at 2 (imposing a
fee of $0.045 per square foot of gross floor area to fund the county's green building fund
for educational purposes, and providing that developers that achieve LEED certification
are eligible for a refund of that fee); BABYLON, N.Y., CODE ch. 89, art. VIII, § 89-96 (2006)
(offering a rebate for projects that achieve LEED certified status); BURBANK, CAL.,
MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 9, ch.1, art. 10 § 10-1008 (effective Dec. 21, 2007) (discounting
permit and plan review fee for participating in the Green Building and Sustainable
Architecture Program); LIVERMORE, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 15, ch. 15.76, § 15.76.070
(2009) (reducing applicable fees if LEED or GreenPoint standards are met); EAGLE
COUNTY, COLO., LAND USE REGULATIONS art. 4, §§ 4-820, 4-920 (2008) (establishing
building permit rebates based on "ECOBuild" points); Borough of Doylestown, Pa.,
Ordinance 2008-8 (Apr. 21, 2008) (reducing permit fees based on Green Points program
and meeting LEED requirements).
52 See, e.g., sources cited supranote 51.
53
John R. Nolon, Shifting Groundto Address ClimateChange: The Land Use Law Solution,
GOV'T, L. & POLY J., Summer 2008, at 23, 29.
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reduced fees and rebates can only provide meaningful savings to developers
if some alternative source replaces the lost revenue.5 4 One logical solution
is to increase the fees that traditional projects must pay in an amount
sufficient to offset the costs of the program. This cost-shifting weapon is
already evident in the green initiatives arsenal. To the extent that the fee
increases are substantial, developers who choose not to participate in the
incentive program are likely to challenge the legality of the approach.
One alternative development preference device has the intriguing
potential to encourage green design and construction practices at little or
no public cost. The tactic, which many municipalities now employ, offers
green builders development bonuses-increased density ratios or more
generous height restrictions.5 5 If these development bonuses can truly be
given at no cost to society, this approach may be the ideal solution to the
problem of financing green building incentives. The prospect of a cost-free
solution probably explains why so many jurisdictions have already adopted
this device.
But are development bonuses really free, and can they provide
sufficient incentives to drive green development? A cost-benefit analysis
of these programs requires an assessment of the infrastructure and social
costs of the greater intensity growth that they permit, as well as a review
of the financial projections for a particular project.5 6 The calculus here
54

To help fund its program, which includes permit fee rebates for residential projects that
exceed threshold green building standards, Eagle County, Colorado imposes fees on other
projects. EAGLE COUNTY, COLO., LAND USE REGULATIONS art. 4 §§ 4-820, 4-920 (2008). The

Town of Babylon, New York charges certain building projects a fee, not to exceed $15,000,
of $0.03 per square foot, which is held in a Green Building Fund; BABYLON, N.Y., CODE ch.
89, art. VIII, § 89-96 (2006). Applicants who achieve LEED certified status receive a
refund of the fee. Id. The proposed Portland, Oregon "feebate" system also uses this
approach. See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. See infra notes 68-69 and
accompanying text.
55
See, e.g., Arlington Board Meeting of March 14, 2009, supranote 37, at 2; BELLINGHAM,
WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 20, ch. 35, § 20.35.070 (2009); PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES tit. 9, art. VI, ch. 915, § 915.04.D (2009); Long Beach, Cal., Ordinance 090013 (Apr. 21, 2009); KEARNY, N.J. CODE ch. XXVII, § 27-4 (2008); GERMANTOWN, TENN.,
SMARTCODE art. 2, § 2.2.11 (adopted Aug. 13, 2007); PORTSMOUTH, N.H., ZONING
ORDINANCE, art. III, § 10-304 (amended Apr. 4, 2007).
5
The Arlington County, Virginia planning staff recently recommended reducing the level
of bonus densities for the stated reason that "it is becoming more common for developers
to design and construct buildings that meet the standards of the basic LEED Certified
level..." Arlington Board Meeting of March 14, 2009, supra note 37, at 6-7. From this
comment alone, one cannot determine whether the original bonuses succeeded by helping
developers begin to recognize the intrinsic value of green building practices or whether the
bonuses were too generous (either because they gave developers a greater incentive than
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can be tricky. If, for example, the standard density and height restrictions
reflect sound land use planning decisions, then the variances for green
buildings may overtax existing public facilities, such as roads, utilities, and
schools, or they may adversely affect the quality of life in the community.
That may mean that even if development bonuses have no immediate budgetary impact for the community, a program that systematically relieves
developers from established land use restrictions may become controversial as more and more projects exceed the generally preferred density and
height standards. Even if the sustainable features of the greener projects
completely offset the disadvantages of the more intense land use, the community still may eventually need to raise significant revenue to cover any
additional infrastructure costs that the higher intensity developments
may ultimately require. Perhaps in some cases more intense development will not add any significant public costs, but if so, that may indicate
that the lower density and height restrictions were unnecessary, excessive
regulation of development in the first place. Indeed, the most significant
question that development bonus programs present is not whether communities should permit greater density to induce developers to build green,
but whether they should broadly embrace denser development standards
because they are intrinsically more sustainable.5"
While all of the incentive programs described to this point are
relatively low cost approaches, they all suffer from one potentially fatal
defect: the benefits they offer may be inadequate to induce developers to
make optimum capital investments in design and construction practices
to achieve truly sustainable development across the entire spectrum of real
estate projects. A profit-driven developer will only spend so much for the
promotional value of public recognition and admiration." Information and
free consultation will only induce a rational investor to increase expenditures for the sake of sustainability if they demonstrate that the additional

was required or because they inappropriately compromised the objectives of the county's
density controls). Whatever may be the full explanation, the point here is that density
bonus programs require careful calibration.
" See Nolon, supranote 53, at 23-25. See also John R. Nolon, The Land Use Stabilization
Wedge Strategy:Shifting Ground to Mitigate Climate Change, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.
& POLY REV. 1 (2009).
5 See YUDELSON ASSOCS.,GREEN BUILDING INCENTIVES THAT WORK 10-11, 15 (Nat'l Ass'n
of Indus. and Office Properties Research Found.) (2007), availableat http://www.naiop
.org/foundation/greenincentives.pdf (stating that developer respondents to survey felt that
small cost increases for building green would be a barrier and that they had not received
enough publicity or new business from their decision to go green).
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investment will generate a positive return through operating cost savings
or premium returns on investment.5 9 Realistically, fee reductions and rebates should normally produce no more than dollar-for-dollar investments
in sustainability. Depending on the local circumstances, expedited review
60
and development bonuses may have relatively high value to developers,
but even those approaches will not induce a developer to spend more on
sustainability than the projected value to the developer of the benefit
offered. More importantly, by their nature, these benefits will have little
impact on projects that are not significantly constrained by processing delays or density and height restrictions. Thus, even though the expedited
review and development bonus programs may be exceptionally effective
in certain heavily developed population centers (especially if offered by all
of the agencies having approval authority over the project), they probably
hold much less promise in cities that already permit relatively intense
land uses, in many suburbs, and in communities with relatively streamlined and efficient permitting processes (or hopelessly complex processes
that involve multiple, uncoordinated agencies),61
Of course, even with these potential problems in mind, if public
policy makers determine that the relatively inexpensive incentive programs already described are adequate for their sustainability objectives,
then government may be able to avoid the most nettlesome funding issues
discussed in this Article. That is, public incentives of the kind discussed
above-especially those that require only modest processing and fee incentives and those that rely heavily on development bonuses-may provide all the encouragement that developers need to become sustainable."
These programs may not require dedicated funding resources and probably can be operated in most jurisdictions without triggering protests from
the development community or property rights advocates. But are these
low-cost, low-controversy approaches adequate to achieve the desired level
of sustainability?
59

See id. at 13-14 (finding that the biggest barrier, according to the developers surveyed, to
growth in the green building industry was the perceived increased cost of green buildings).
' See, e.g., id. at 12 (finding that expedited permitting and density bonuses were valued
as much, or nearly as much as financial incentives, by developers in deciding to build a
green project).
61
See, e.g., EDAW, INC. CASE STUDY: CITY OF CHICAGO GREEN PERMIT PROGRAM 1 (2008)
http://www.cityofseattle.gov/environment/documents/GBIF-Chicago-Green-permit.case
_study.pdf (stating that expedited review is not very valuable when permitting already
occurs at a rapid pace).
62 See YUDELSON Assocs., supra note 58, at 12.
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Sustainability in a strong sense requires enormous capital expenditures at the design and construction stages of a project.6 1 If, for example,
a growing community resolves that its overall greenhouse gas emissions
must be significantly less tomorrow than they are today, it may be essential
for new real estate projects to be designed and built to standards that require more capital investment than the present value of the future energy
savings involved for a particular project. Similarly, if an entire state or
region decided that it could no longer leave it to future generations to deal
with the tremendous amounts of waste that the built environment generates, then recycling solutions would have to be implemented, even if they
involved costs that put significant pressure on the financial projections
of a particular project. A society that commits to economic development
that promotes more equitable global patterns of resource consumption and
distribution must require individual projects to internalize more of the
global social costs of current development, even though the social burdens
involved have little or no immediate impact on the local economy.
Reflecting some of these more ambitious sustainability perspectives, several states and municipalities have decided to offer greater economic incentives. 6' These are powerful market-based tools that have the
potential to induce investment that will pay-off not simply in operating
cost savings and premium market values for the specific project involved,
but in long-term advancements in sustainability that will accrue to the
local community as a whole, to the region, to the nation, and to the entire
planet. In this category, several states offer, or authorize their political
subdivisions to offer, green building incentives in the form of substantial
tax benefits. These include state income or other tax credits or deductions
based on the costs of capital expenditures for more sustainable building

s See, e.g., NYLWasteLe$$, Green Building, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nycwasteless/html/
in-business/greenbuilding.shtml (last visited Oct. 25, 2009) (indicating that initial construction costs of green buildings, in New York City, are up to three percent higher than
traditional buildings for commercial construction and up to eighteen percent higher for
residential construction).
See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW, § 19(a)(2) (McKinney 2009) (providing, in general, for a tax
credit equal to 1.4% of "allowable costs" on new green buildings); MD. CODE ANN., TAXGEN. § 10-722(c)(1) (2009) (providing an eight percent tax credit for allowed costs on green
buildings); BALTIMORE, MD., BALTIMORE COUNTY CODE art. II, tit. 2, § 11-2-203. 1(c) (2009)
(providing for tax credits of up to eighty percent of assessed property taxes for buildings
meeting certain LEED certifications); King County, Green Tools Incentives and Grants,
http://your.kingconty.gov/solidwaste/greenbuilding/incentives/index (last visited Oct. 25,
2009) (providing grants of up to $35,000 for projects achieving certain LEED certifications).
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features and practices.'m Others offer property tax abatements or credits. 66
Beyond these tax incentives, some localities contemplate low-cost public
financing for qualifying expenditures, 7 and others directly reimburse developers or homeowners for qualifying capital expenditures or provide grants
to cover certain green building costs. 6s Tax benefits, reimbursements and

6

See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 19(a) (McKinney 2009) (offering green building tax credits and
making them transferable); MD. CODE ANN., TAx-GEN. § 10-722(b) (LexisNexis 2009)
(offering an income tax credit for green building and green components).
6 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 9-242(b) (LexisNexis 2009); TEx TAX CODE ANN.
§ 312.204 (Vernon 2009); HOwARD COUNTY, MD., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 20, subtitle 1,
pt. III, § 20.129B (2009); MONTGOMERYCOUNTY, MD., CODE pt. II, ch. 52, § 52-18Q (2009);
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD., CODE tit. 2, art. 11 §§ 11-2-203.1 through .2 (2009); Harris
County, Tex., Guidelines & Criteria for Granting Tax Abatements in a Reinvestment
Zone (May 20, 2008); Cincinnati, Ohio, Ordinance 446-2007 § 2 (Dec. 12, 2007).
67 See MAYOR MENINO'S GREEN BLDG. TASK FORCE, MAYOR MENINO'S GREEN BUILDING
TASK FORCE REPORT, ExECUTIvE SUMMARY 8-9 (2004), available at http://www.boston
greenbuiling.org/ (follow "Click here to view the Executive Summary" hyperlink) (suggesting the establishment of a loan fund to help finance green building). Several public financing devices could be used to provide funds for green building costs, including tax increment
financing and municipal bond programs. See Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Infrastructure
and the Law: Florida'sPast,Presentand Future,23 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 441,449-51
(2008) (discussing the use of tax increment financing and other innovative devices to fund
infrastructure programs). Berkeley, California offers an alternative approach that illustrates the potential to use municipal bonds to finance green building costs. See BERKELEY,
CAL., CODE tit. 7, ch. 7.98, § 7.98.140 (2009). It provides property owners an opportunity
to borrow money from the City's Sustainable Energy Financing District to install solar
installations and energy efficiency improvements and allows the cost to be repaid over
twenty years through an annual special tax included with their property tax bills. See
Memorandum from Mayor Tom Bates to the Berkeley, Cal. City Council (Nov. 6, 2007)
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us (search "approval of concept of financing district" then follow
"RgPDF32Doc" hyperlink) [hereinafter Berkeley City Council Action Plan]. The project is
funded through issuance of bonds. See id.; BERKELEY, CAL., CODE tit. 7, ch. 7.98, § 7.98.140
(2009). While the program does not target developers, and repayment of the bonds does
not depend on developer fees, see Berkeley City Council Action Plan, supra, it might be
possible to structure a program along similar lines that disburses municipal bond proceeds
to fund investment in sustainable design and construction, and that uses sustainability
impact fees as a source for repaying the bonds. The principles and limitations concerning
municipal bonds, however, are well beyond the scope of this Article. Green building incentives at the federal level are also beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, pt. II 123 Stat. 115, 322 et
seq. & § 1201, 123 Stat. 222-23; Emergency Energy Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 307, 122 Stat. 3765, 3847 (amending 26 U.S.C. 142); American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, tit. VII, § 701, 118 stat. 1418, 1536-40 (2004).
68 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 6-1451.06 (2009) (directing the mayor to develop a sustainability
oriented incentive program and authorizing grants for builders meeting certain LEED
standards); King County, Residential Green Building Incentives, http://your.kingcounty
.gov/solidwaste/greenbuildinglincentives/residential.asp (last visited Oct. 25,2009) (provid1

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 34:55

grants for green building costs are the incentives that have the greatest
potential to revolutionize industry practices and to bring about a level of
investment in green building design and construction practices that will
assure true sustainability in the generational and global sense promoted
by the international sustainability movement. It is these programs that
will require the most substantial public funding devices and that will incite
the greatest political controversy.
There are several early signs that these more potent and expensive
programs will require dedicated funding devices. State tax credit programs,
for example, may be funded by limited or temporary allocations set by the
legislatures.6 9 Once projects have received aggregated credits equal to the
pre-approved limit, no more credits will be available unless or until the legislature approves additional credits.70 Even without legislative appropriation limits, adequate funding sources will be critical if progressive green
building programs are to survive fiscal analysis. Absent careful calculations, an incentive program may have unanticipated budgetary consequences.7 An overly generous Nevada property tax abatement formula,
for example, had to be completely restructured to avoid perceived windfall
benefits to large developments." Depending on how they are administered,
other tax programs could also have significant adverse financial impacts
on the communities and taxing districts that lose revenue.73
Because so many of these programs are of relatively recent origin,7"
it is difficult to judge how expensive they will be or whether developer

ingfor grants up to $20,000 for qualifying multifamily residential projects); King County,
Commercial Green Building Incentives, http://your.kingcounty.gov/solidwaste/greenbuilding/
incentives/commercial.asp
(providing up to $35,000 for qualifying commercial projects).
6
9 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 10-722(k)(1)(vi) (LexisNexis 2009); N.Y. TAX LAW
§ 19(c)(1)(a-b) (McKinney 2009).
7 E.g., Comptroller of Md., Green Building Tax Credit, http://business.marylandtaxes
.com/taxinfo/taxcredit/greenbldg/default.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2009) (stating that all
authorized Maryland Green Building Tax Credits for the period were allocated).
71 See Darren A. Prum, Digest of Selected Articles: What You Should Know About Green
Building, 36 REAL EST. L. J. 239, 250-51 (2007).
72 Id. at 250-51; Darren A. Prum, Greeting State Incentives for Commercial Green
Buildings,
34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REv. 171 (2009).
73
See, e.g., CINCINNATI, OHIO, ORDINANCE 446-2007 (Dec. 12,2007) (authorizing property
tax exemptions of up to one hundred percent for a maximum period of fifteen years for
certain projects based on LEED certification status); HOWARD COUNTY, MD., CODE OF
ORDINANCES tit. 20, subtitle 1, pt. III, § 20.129(B) (2009) (allowing property tax credits to
be effective from three to five years in amounts ranging from ten to seventy-five percent).
14 See, e.g., MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE pt. II, ch. 52, § 52-18Q (2009) (effective
Mar. 17, 2008); HOWARD COUNTY, MD., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 20, subtitle I, pt. III, § 20
(2009)); Cincinnati, Ohio, Ordinance 446-2007 (Dec. 12, 2007).
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funding mechanisms could contribute to their success. Reported dollar
limits for grants and reimbursement amounts range from relatively small
sums75 to figures that could potentially add up to significant total expenditures7 6 and even to amounts that seem too large to be practicable without
significant funding, even if they are used for only a few projects each year.77
The prospect that land use authorities will turn to developer funding solutions to finance increasingly significant costs of green building
incentives noticeably looms on the horizon." A few programs already use
a form of "feebate," which may be the most promising developer funding
device. One example is Arlington County, Virginia's green building fee
that is rebated to qualifying LEED certified projects and is used to support Arlington's green building educational program.79 Similarly, Eagle
County, Colorado's Efficient Building Code provides rebates for residential projects that exceed minimum green building standards; and, in order
to defray some of the costs involved, the program imposes additional fees
on residential projects that do not meet those minimum standards."0
Portland, Oregon's proposed High Performance Green Building Policy
illustrates another progressive use of the feebate device."1 Under the
Portland proposal, traditional projects would pay fees that the city would
75 See, e.g., MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE pt. III, ch. 2, art. LXXXVI, § 2-1258 (2009)

(providing for an award bonus of up to $1,500 for certain projects that operate out of LEED
certified buildings that incorporate qualifying alternative energy systems and that otherwise qualify for an award under the Targeted Jobs Incentive Fund Program).
76 For example, a King County, Washington program provides grants for certain residential projects, in amounts ranging from $2,500 for single-family residences, up to $20,000
for multifamily projects of ten or more units. King County, Residential Green Building
Incentives, http://your.kingcounty.gov/solidwaste/greenbuilding/incentives/residential.asp
(last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
7 See, e.g., El Paso, Tex., Resolution (approved Sept. 11, 2007) (providing grants as high
as $400,000 for LEED Platinum projects that also meet certain economic development
criteria).
76 See Montgomery County, Md., Council Bill 30-07 § 2 (Apr. 22, 2008) (proposing
an
"Environmental Sustainability Fee" on owners ofbuilding that do not meet specified energy
efficiency and environmental design criteria); MAYOR'S ENERGY ADVISORY COMMISSION,
FINAL REPORT TO MAYOR HARRY KIM 3-3 (2008), http://www.co.hawaii.hi.us/bc/eac/Final
%20Report%20to%20Mayor%20-%2OExec%2OSummary.pdf (recommending a study for
Hawai'i County, Hawaii to investigate the feasibility of imposing a sustainability impact
fee on builders and developers who do not adhere to energy efficiency practices). See also
Kingsley, supra note 1, at 542-55.
79
Arlington Board Meeting of March 14, 2009, supra note 37, at 2.
so EAGLE COUNTY, COLO., LAND USE REGULATIONS art. 4, div. 4-8, §§ 4-820, 4-920 (2008).
81See OFFICE OF SUSTAINABILITY OF DEVELOPMENT, CITY OF PORTLAND PROPOSED HIGH
PERFORMANCE GREEN BUILDING POLICY 5-6 (2008), availableat http://www.portlandonline
.com/osd/index.cfm?c=45879&a=220879.
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use to offset the lost revenue from reduced development fees charged to
developers that implement "moderate" green building standards. s2 The
city would also use the fees collected from traditional projects to finance fee
rebates for green projects that go beyond the "moderate" level."a In effect,
these rebates would reimburse for the costs of certain "high performance
standards."a'
One important practical question that these and similar approaches
present is how effectively state and local governments can use developer
fees to finance costly green building incentives within applicable legal limitations. This is the question that the balance of this Article addresses.

II.

LIMITING PRINCIPLES

Over the past twenty-five years much attention has focused on the
legality of developer fees imposed to finance infrastructure and other
public costs associated with real estate development.8 5 In recognition of
the fundamental role that the United States Supreme Court's regulatory
takings jurisprudence has played in that story, this Part first reviews the
relevant constitutional issues.8 " Next, this Part discusses the other principles that state courts have applied in developer fee cases.8 7 Because the
Supreme Court's recent takings cases may signal a willingness to leave
land use controls largely to the states, 8 this Article argues that the state
law principles governing developer fees will likely take on the dominant
role in determining the extent to which land use authorities may use
developer fees to finance progressive green building programs.
A.

Federal ConstitutionalLimits on SustainabilityExactions

In what ways does the U.S. Constitution limit how states and local
governments may fund green building programs through developer
exactions, such as land dedication requirements or impact and mitigation
fees? To the extent that a program imposes an exaction as a condition to

82
83

4

9

85

Id. at 5, 8-11.
Id.
ld.

See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 507-08 n.1 (2d ed., Practitioner Treatise Series, 2007)
(providing an extensive list of law review articles and other publications discussing exactions and other developer financing devices).
a See infra Part II.A. 1.
87 See infra Part II.
a See infra Part II.A. 1.c.
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a development approval, the courts have resorted to several constitutional
principles, but the dominant ones derive from the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause. 9
1.

The Range of Potential Constitutional Restrictions

In addition to Takings Clause issues, the other constitutional limitations that most commonly bear on land use controls of all kinds entail:
due process, equal protection, First Amendment rights, and Commerce
Clause principles.9" Land use regulations also sometimes implicate other
constitutional considerations, such as rights of association, travel, and
privacy. 9 But practically speaking, aside from takings claims, the most
common bases for challenging land use exactions, involve due process
and equal protection claims.9 2 For that reason, before analyzing how the
Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence should apply to sustainability
fees, this Part briefly reviews the relatively modest limitations that due
process and equal protection principles present in this context.
Land use cases sometimes present valid procedural due process
claims, but these usually involve alleged flaws peculiar to the specific
process by which a restriction or condition was imposed on the plaintiff.
Examples include fundamental unfairness resulting from ex parte
communications,93 inadequate notice of the matters to be taken up at a
city council meeting, 4 unusual delays,95 and a potentially biased hearing
panel.9" Procedural due process claims, therefore, would not normally be

89 See infra Part II.A.1.a.
90 See generally JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 85, at 580-81, 710-11.
"' See Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974).
92 See, e.g., Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Madison, 10 F. Supp. 2d 617, 620 (S.D. Miss.
1997); KMST, LLC v. County ofAda, 67 P.3d 56,59 (Idaho 2003); Holmdel Builders Ass'n
v. Twp. of Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277, 280 (N.J. 1990).
" Historic Pres. Council, Inc. v. City Council, 8 P.3d 646, 649-51 (determining that telephone communications with council members violated due process standards because the
identities of the callers and the substance of the conversations were not disclosed).
14 Nasierowski Bros. Inv. Co. v. City of Sterling Heights, 949 F.2d 890,
892-96 (6th Cir.
1991) (involving a zoning change that was not included in the public notice for the
meeting and that was made during an executive session).
" Tri County Indus., Inc. v. Dist. of Columbia, 104 F.3d 455, 460-62 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(holding that an oral order suspending a building permit indefinitely and made without
a hearing violated due process principles).
9 Macene v. MJW, Inc., 951 F.2d 700, 704-06 (6th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that a biased
decision making process may violate procedural due process, but determining that the
plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment).
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appropriate to challenge an exaction program that follows customary
procedures for making land use decisions.
Developers and property owners frequently invoke substantive due
process and equal protection principles to challenge land use controls, including exaction conditions.9" Unless the government action implicates
a fundamental right or affects a suspect or quasi-suspect class, however,
a substantive due process or equal protection claim need only survive a
highly deferential, rational basis review.9" And, because land use regulations normally involve considerations of public health, safety, and welfare, rational basis review leaves little room for judicial second guessing,
especially in the face of a legislative decision.9 9 "[A] legislative choice is
not subject to courtroom factfinding [sic] and may be based on rational
speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.' ' °
An especially common judicial analysis reasons that a land use regulation is valid as a matter of substantive due process unless it is "clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare."' 0 ' The Supreme Court explained
that this standard establishes the limited "right to be free of arbitrary or
irrational zoning actions."' 2 Under the rational basis framework, courts
applying a substantive due process analysis have naturally been reluctant
to second guess legislative judgments that only affect property rights.'1 3
" See Kenneth D. Farmer, Impact Fees: An Alternative Way to Finance Facilitiesin
Mississippi,28 MIss. C. L. REv. 287, 294-97 (2009); Floyd B. Olson et al., The Future of
Impact Fees in Minnesota, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 635, 658-59 (1998).
98 See generally JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supranote 85, at 651-52.
9 See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
10
0 Id.
101 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. at 395 (1926) (citations omitted). The
Supreme Court recently acknowledged the continuing relevance of the Euclid substantive
due process analysis. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540-41 (2005).
.OVill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977). See also
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-89 (1928) (holding that a single-family
zoning classification, as applied to the plaintiffs specific tract that could not feasibly be
used for the permitted purpose bore no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare).
103 See, e.g., Cherokee County v. Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Ass'n, 566 S.E.2d 470,
473-75 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); Home BuildersAss'n v. Cityof West Des Moines, 644 N.W.2d
339, 351 (Iowa 2002). In an unusual setting, the Court invoked a due process analysis to
invalidate a land use regulation that defined "family" for purposes of a single-family zoning
district in such a manner that it made "a crime of a grandmother's choice to live with her
grandson." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977). While the Court
did not characterize the ordinance as involving a fundamental right, the fact that the
restriction interfered with basic personal liberties and family relationships heavily in-
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In effect, the breadth of the police power over land use provides 10a 4rational
basis for most common land use controls, including exactions.
While it is possible to imagine a sustainable development program
that could fail under the substantive due process standard,0 5 green building initiatives of the kind discussed in Part I should easily pass substantive due process analysis. Any carefully conceived green building program
should likewise be able to justify developer fees based on express legislative findings that the programs the fees support serve the public health
10 6
and general welfare in the same way that environmental regulations do.
Land use regulations also frequently foster distinct equal protection
claims because land use controls typically rely on classifications to determine which landowners or projects are subject to particular restrictions
or requirements.0 7 But a governmental classification or other distinction
founded on a rational basis will withstand equal protection scrutiny unless
the case involves a suspect class or a fundamental right, factors which
are not often present in land use cases.' "In areas of social and economic
policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines
fluenced the Court's conclusion that "the usual judicial deference to the legislature is inappropriate." Id. In a more common context, restrictive single-family zoning ordinances
pass constitutional scrutiny. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974).
104 See Charles C. Mulcahy & Michelle J. Zimet, Impact Fees for a Developing Wisconsin,
79 MARQ. L. REV. 759, 771-72 (1996).
For example, one might argue that a program primarily intended to implement a global
social justice model of sustainability might not be rationally related to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare as those terms are commonly used in substantive due
process cases. See Carl J. Circo, Does SustainabilityRequire a New Theory of Property
Rights?, 58 KAN. L. REV.(forthcoming 2009) [hereinafter Circo, Does SustainabilityRequire].
106 See generally James C. Nicholas & Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Market Based
Approaches to EnvironmentalPreservation:To EnvironmentalMitigationFeesand Beyond,
43 NAT. RES. J. 837, 839-47 (2003) (discussing the political evolution of impact fees, their
roots in the police power, and their current and future applications). Language in some
cases dealing with regulations that significantly burden property rights suggests the
seemingly more demanding requirement that a challenged regulation must "substantially
advance legitimate state interests." Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
See also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825,834 (1987) (both quoting the Agins "substantially advances" standard in the
context of land use exactions). The Supreme Court recently characterized that test as
being "in the nature of a due process" standard. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S.
528, 540 (2005). But at the same time, the Court signaled that substantive due process
does not incorporate the means-ends analysis that the "substantially advances" standard
implies because "we have long eschewed such heightened scrutiny when addressing
substantive due process challenges to government regulation." Id. at 545.
'07 See generally JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supranote 85, at 666-79.
108 Id. at 666.
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nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against
equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable
state of
10 9
classification."
the
for
basis
rational
a
provide
could
that
facts
Exaction cases involving equal protection claims especially arise
when, as is frequently the case, government uses some kind of classification to determine whether to impose an exaction or in order to determine
the nature of an exaction in any given situation. 10 But because exaction
classifications rarely involve any protected class of individuals or fundamental rights, rational basis analysis normally validates the distinctions
that exaction programs use."' On this basis, in Cherokee County v. Greater
Atlanta Homebuilders Assoc., Inc., county impact fees assessed against
unincorporated areas, but not against incorporated areas, survived an
equal protection attack because the county imposed the fees on all developments subject to its authority under applicable state law. 1 2 The fact that
the county had jurisdiction only over unincorporated areas provided the
rational basis for the distinction." 3
Even using the highly deferential rational basis standard, however,
courts can correct invidious discrimination. On that basis, the Supreme
Court invalidated the application of a zoning ordinance that stemmed from
an irrational prejudice against prospective mentally retarded residents
of a proposed group home."' The Court did so despite its unwillingness to
label mental retardation as a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to a
heightened degree of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause."' Additionally, even an individual landowner, as a class of one, has the right to
be free from "intentional and arbitrary discrimination" in the manner in
which otherwise nondiscriminatory laws are applied."' The Supreme
Court applied this principle to hold that requiring a landowner, who
F.C.C. v. Beach Comm., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
See, e.g., Quiland, Inc. v. Wells Sanitary Dist., 905 A.2d 806, 810-11 (Me. 2006);
Cherokee County v. Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Ass'n, 566 S.E.2d 470, 473-75 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2002); Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Twp. of Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277,280 (N.J. 1990).
1See, e.g., Holmdel 583 A.2d at 292 (summarily dismissing an equal protection challenge
to an affordable housing linkage fee by merely noting that the plaintiffs did not claim to
be members of a suspect class).
112 566 S.E.2d at 473-75.
109
110

113

Id. at 474-75.

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447-50 (1985). The zoning
district involved permitted apartments, boarding houses, and a variety of other multipleoccupant uses, including hospitals and nursing homes "other than for the insane or feebleminded." Id. at 436 n.6.
114

'15

Id. at 446-47.

...
Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
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requested municipal water service, to dedicate a sewer easement wider
than what was required of other landowners was a valid equal protection
claim." 7 The Court explained that the landowner had been "intentionally
treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no
rational basis for the difference in treatment.""' That holding, however,
goes no further than to confirm the unremarkable notion that a complaint
alleging discrimination for which no rational basis exists states a claim
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss." 19
In sum, due process and equal protection considerations impose
only modest limitations on the ability of state and local governments to
adopt green building programs and to finance some of the costs through
developer fees. 2 ° In general, due process and equal protection principles
may restrict the way in which developer funding programs may be administered, but not whether they may be implemented at all. It is time, therefore, to turn attention to the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence, which
historically has provided the most significant constitutional limitations
affecting land use exactions.
2.

Takings Analysis

Justice O'Connor's opinion for a unanimous Court in Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. provides a concise restatement of the Court's complex approach to the regulatory takings issue."'2 The specific question the
case presented was whether Hawaii took Chevron's property without just
compensation by capping the rent that an oil company could charge its
dealer-lessees.' 22 While the "paradigmatic taking" subject to the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment occurs when government directly appropriates or physically invades private property, regulation may also trigger

117

Id. at 563-65.

11 8

Id. at 564.

119

Id. at 565.

See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005) ("[W]e have long
eschewed such heightened scrutiny when addressing substantive due process challenges
to government regulation.'); Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Twp. of Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277,292
(N.J. 1990) (dismissing an equal protection challenge because plaintiffs did not claim to
be members of a suspect class, which made the regulations at issue "reasonable exercises
of statutory zoning and police powers.").
121 Lingle, 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005).
122 Id. at 532.
120
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the Takings Clause. 2 ' The essential concept of a regulatory taking is
that "government regulation of private property may, in some instances,
be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or
2 4 Chevron based its claim on the theory that government reguouster....,,1
lation of private property constitutes a taking if the regulation "does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests."'' Although the "substantially advances" principle had gained acceptance "through simple
repetition" ' in several of the Court's takings opinions,'2 7 the Court used
the Lingle case to "correct course" and hold that the "formula is not a valid
takings test, and.., has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence." 2 '
While Justice O'Connor recognized that the Court's "regulatory
takings jurisprudence cannot be characterized as unified,"' 29 she distilled
from the cases four distinct categories of regulatory takings, none of which
were, in her view, founded on the "substantially advances" formula. 3 ' Two
categories involve property regulations that are generally per se takings."'
The first involves regulations that cause permanent physical invasion of
private property, such as a requirement that a landlord must allow a cable
television company to attach transmission cables and other communications facilities to the landlord's building.'3 2 The second involves regulations that limit use of the property to such an extent that the owner loses
all economic benefits of ownership, such as a prohibition against building
permanent habitable structures on vacant property that has value only for
its residential development potential.'3 3 According to Justice O'Connor,
these two circumstances represent "relatively narrow categories" of regulatory takings.' Most other regulatory takings fall into a third category,
governed imprecisely by the ad hoc balancing test of Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. New York City."' The fourth category involves regulatory takings in

Id. at 537-38.
Id. at 537.
125 Id. at 531 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
123
124
1 26

Id.

Lingle, 544 U.S. at 531-32.
128 Id. at 548.
129 Id. at 539.
130Id. at 538-539, 547.
131 Id. at 538.
132 E.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421, 430 (1982).
133 E.g., Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006-07, 1015, 1031-32 (1992).
134 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538.
135 Id. (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
127
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' Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal
"the special context of land-use exactions."136
3
3
Commission ' and Dolan v. City of Tigard, the two Supreme Court cases
that define this final category, involved land development permits conditioned on the dedication of portions of the land to public use. 3 9
When a property owner asserts that a regulation is a taking by
physical invasion or by denial of economic use, as well as when the owner
claims a Penn Central taking, the controlling inquiry, according to Justice
O'Connor, is essentially the same: Is the regulation "functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain[?]"' 4 ° For each of these
three varieties of regulatory takings the Court has developed a distinct
test that "focuses directly upon the severity of the burden that government
imposes upon private property rights." '' A physical invasion involves a
great burden because it prevents the owner from exercising the right to
exclude others, which is one of the most fundamental rights of property
ownership.14 2 Similarly, a regulation that prevents the owner from using
the property for any economic benefit effectively appropriates the property in every sense other than physically.' 4 3 The Penn Centralbalancing
test also focuses on the burden of regulation by expressly weighing as one
of the key factors "the magnitude of a regulation's economic impact and
the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property interests."'44
None of these three categories support or derive from the "substantially
45
advances" doctrine.1
Only the exactions category of regulatory takings turns primarily
on factors not directly tied to the burden the regulation imposes on property
rights. In the exactions context, two inquiries in the nature of heightened
scrutiny apply. First, there must be an "essential nexus" between the
exaction required as a condition to the requested development approval
and some legitimate public purpose that could be served by denying the

Id.
137 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
13' Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
139 See id. at 377; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827.
140 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
141 Id.
136

142 id.

See id. at 539-40 (citations omitted).
Id. at 540.
145 Id. at 542-43.
143
144
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development approval. 14 Second, the exaction demanded must be roughly
proportionate "both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development.' 47 Justice O'Connor recognized that the "essential nexus' 48
and "rough proportionality"'49 principles seemed to flow from the "substantially advances" formula upon which Chevron mistakenly relied; 50
but, as discussed below,' 5 ' she ultimately concluded that the Nollan and
52
Dolan cases established an "entirely distinct" rule.
To what extent may a sustainable development fee program be susceptible to a regulatory taking challenge under any of the four categories
that Lingle identifies? Developer funding programs should not ordinarily
trigger either of the per se categories. First, they have purely economic
impacts on the property owner, so developer fees do not present instances
of physical invasion by regulation. Second, no sustainable development fee
program presently under consideration is so aggressive that it could be
53
expected to preclude economically viable use of the affected property.
The other two categories, however, merit much greater attention. Because,
prior to Lingle, many cases and commentators debated whether developer
fees should be subject to the Court's land use exaction analysis, 5 4 the
discussion that follows first analyzes that controversial category in light
of Lingle before considering the more broadly applicable Penn Central
balancing test.
a.

Sustainable Development Fees under Nollan and Dolan

In Lingle, Justice O'Connor indicated that the heightened scrutiny
principles of Nollan and Dolan apply only in the particular circumstances
that gave rise to those cases. 55 As explained above, she first carefully

Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987).
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
148 Nollan, 485 U.S. at 837.
149 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
150 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547-48.
' See infra Part II.A.2.a.
152Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547.
153 While this means that it should be difficult to mount a facial challenge to any of the
funding programs discussed in Part I, the prospect for a viable as-applied challenge under
particular facts always remains. See generallyNectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183,
187-88 (1928) (invalidating an otherwise constitutional zoning ordinance as applied to
the particular circumstances of the landowner's property).
1 See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
5See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538.
146

147
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divided the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence into three primary
groupings-the two "relatively narrow categories" that she placed under
the heading of per se takings, and the much broader Penn Central
category.156 In her initial overview, she gave Nollan and Dolan only a brief,
parenthetical reference following her explanation of the two per se categories. "Outside of these two relatively narrow categories (and the special
context of land-use exactions discussed below [citation omitted]), regulatory takings challenges are governed by the standards set forth in Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)."''1 This suggests that Nollan and Dolan define a specialized doctrine that also forms
is at least as limited in its
a relatively narrow classification, one that
158
application as the two per se categories.
When Justice O'Connor eventually turned her attention explicitly
to Nollan and Dolan, she reinforced this characterization. Those cases, she
explained, applied the Takings Clause "to adjudicative land-use exactionsspecifically, government demands that a landowner dedicate an easement
allowing public access to her property as a condition of obtaining a develop' They presented instances of physical invasions via projectment permit."159
specific regulation. 6 ° "[B]oth involved dedications of property so onerous
that, outside the exactions context, they would be deemed per se physical
takings."16 ' The required dedication in each case differed from a classic
physical invasion, however, in that the governmental demand for an
easement did not originate with government action directly intended to
make public use of private property; rather, it was a governmental
response, in the form of a condition, to the landowner's request for

156Id.
157 Id.

An interesting alternative reading is that Nollan and Dolan do not define a separate
category at all, but involve a subset of the physical invasion category. See JUERGENSMEYER
158

& ROBERTS, supranote 85, at 596-97. The analysis is that Nollan and Dolan effectively
create an exception to the general rule that a regulation that effects a physical invasion
requires compensation. Id. at 597. That is, a land dedication requirement will escape the
per se rule of Loretto v. Teleprompter ManhattanCATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) if the
exaction satisfies the essential nexus and rough proportionality tests of Nollan and Dolan.
See id. at 584, 596-97. While this rendering offers the advantage of logical coherence, it
presents the disadvantage of conflicting with the Court's less tidy analysis in Lingle,
which emphasized the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See infra notes 160-68 and
accompanying text.
159See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546.
1'Id. at 547.
161 Id.
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discretionary development approval for the landowner's proposed
'
project.'6 2 Moreover, the Court's use of the adjective "adjudicative"1 63
indicates that it also may be relevant that in both cases the government
imposed the exaction condition in the context of a land development
approval proceeding for a specific project rather than under a legislative
program imposing similar exactions on a legislatively defined class of
property owners or projects. In this sense, the constitutional underpinnings of Nollan and Dolan go beyond the Takings Clause; they
involve a special application of the "doctrine of'unconstitutional conditions,"' which provides that "the government
may not require a person to give up a constitutional
right-here the right to receive just compensation when
property is taken for a public use- in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the
benefit has little or no relationship to the property."16' 4
The doctrine protects against deprivation of constitutional rights through
opportunistic governmental extortion16 5 or gimmickry.'6 6 "It reflects the
triumph of the view that government may not do indirectly what it may
not do directly over the view that the greater power to deny a benefit
includes the lesser power to impose a condition on its receipt. ' ' 6 7
As explained by Justice O'Connor, the principles of Nollan and
Dolan should not apply to developer funding devices. While the Fifth
Amendment prohibits the government from appropriating an easement
without paying for it, no provision of the Constitution guarantees landowners the right to develop their property without paying fees. 68 Put

See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987).
163 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547.
16 Id. (quoting Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385).
165 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
166 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 387.
167Kathleen M.Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions,102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989).
161In the context of land use controls, the police power has long prevailed over any notion
that a property owner has a constitutional right to use the property free from governmental regulation. See Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124-28
(1978); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Advocates of strong
property rights offer an alternative view by arguing that a landowner has a fundamental
right to put the property to an economically beneficial use, albeit a right subject to limited
governmental regulation to prevent harmful uses. See James S. Burling, Do Inclusionary
162
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another way, from a constitutional law perspective, a governmental demand for a fee in exchange for development approval is not comparable
to a governmental demand for a free easement in exchange for the same
approval. Thus, so far as the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is
concerned, the government should be free to require a landowner to pay
fees in exchange for a discretionary development approval. In Justice
O'Connor's taxonomy, therefore, a takings challenge to a developer fee
(assuming that it does not threaten the economic viability of the property)
calls for Penn Central'sbalancing analysis and not the heightened judicial
scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan.
Without the didactic benefit of Lingle, however, earlier courts and
commentators disagreed about whether Nollan and Dolan limited the
power of government to impose land use exactions in the form of monetary
impositions.'69 The precise issue presented in Lingle-whether the "substantially advances" formula established a proper takings test-motivated
Justice O'Connor to place Nollan and Dolanoutside of the Court's mainstream takings jurisprudence. 7 ° This was particularly important to the
analysis in Lingle because much of the Court's language in the exactions
cases could otherwise support a far broader reading of the relevant constitutional principles. For example, one passage from Justice Scalia's opinion
in Nollan implies that any kind of land use exaction condition "not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government purpose"
might constitute a taking.'7 ' Justice Scalia acknowledged that "a permit
condition that serves the same legitimate police-power purpose as a refusal
to issue the permit should not be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue
the permit would not constitute a taking."'7 2 But a condition that "utterly
fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition"

Zoning Laws Violate Nollan, Dolan and the Doctrine of UnconstitutionalConditions?,
ENGAGE J. FEDERALIST SOc'Y PRAc. GROUPS, Oct. 2007, at 83, 86. From this perspective,

there is no basis to distinguish between a condition in the form of a land dedication and
one in the form of a monetary exaction. See id. at 83-85. In Lingle, however, the Court
made it clear that the constitutional right burdened by the unconstitutional conditions
in Nollan and Dolanwas the right to just compensation for property taken for public use
and not the right to put property to an economically beneficial use. See 544 U.S. at 547.
169 See generally Steven A. Haskins, Closing the Dolan Deal-Bridgingthe Legislative!
Adjudicative Divide,38 URB. LAW. 487,488-91,495-500 (2006); Nicholas & Juergensmeyer,

supra note 106, at 601-03.

170 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547-48.

Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (quoting Penn Central, 438
U.S. at 127).
172
Id. at 836.
171
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lacks the "essential nexus" that the Constitution requires. '13 Justice Scalia
equated a condition of that ilk to "an out-and-out plan of extortion. 1 74
These statements suggested that any development approval condition
must be analyzed rigorously for an essential nexus.
In Dolan, Chief Justice Rehnquist, added the "rough proportionality" test to Nollan's essential nexus standard,'7 5 which reflected a commitment to the "substantially advances"'7 6 doctrine. Under the "rough
proportionality" rule, even if an exaction condition advances the relevant
governmental purpose in the sense required by Dolan,the Takings Clause
still requires the government to establish "some sort of individualized
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and
extent to the impact of the proposed development."' The second part of
the exaction standard, therefore, concerns "the required degree of connection between the exactions and the projected impact of the proposed development."'7 v The Dolan Court's extensive analysis of the City of Tigard's
decision to condition development approval on the landowner's agreement
to dedicate a greenway for flood control purposes illustrates that this additional requirement calls for a relatively demanding means-ends review.'79
The Court conceded that the additional impervious surface areas of the
retail expansion that the landowner proposed would contribute to the risk
of flooding in the area. 8 0 But, at most, the record before the Court could
only justify a simple restriction prohibiting the landowner from building
in the flood plain.'' ' The city has never said why a public greenway, as
opposed to a private one, was required in the interest of flood control."'82
Even more telling was the Court's basis for rejecting the city's traffic congestion justification for requiring the landowner to dedicate a public pathway for pedestrians and bicyclists.' 83 While the city's traffic studies and
estimates provided support for the city's finding that the pathway dedication could offset some of the increased traffic, they were inadequate to
173Id.

at 837.

174 Dolan

v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,,387 (1994) (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v.
Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981)).
175

Id. at 386, 391.

171Id. at

385 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).

177Id. at 391.
178

Id. at 386.
id. at 391-95.

179See

1"o
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 387, 392-93.
'81

Id. at 393.

182

Id.

183See

id. at 395-96.
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establish that the pathway in fact would, or at least was likely to, have
that effect."M The Court's effort to clarify offered little more than judicial
doublespeak: "No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the
city must make some effort to quantify its findings in support of the
dedication .... "185
Nollan's and Dolan'sbroadly stated bases for heightened judicial
scrutiny of land use approval conditions predictably led some courts and
commentators to regard not only dedication requirements, but other devel1 8 This
opment exactions with suspicion."
continued to be so even after the
1999 decision in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,"s7
in which the Court expressly signaled a much narrower application of the
proportionality test.' But by completely discrediting the "substantially
advances" means-ends formula and by emphasizing the unconstitutional
conditions rationale, Justice O'Connor's opinion in Lingle all but forecloses
the viability of Nollan and Dolan beyond those circumstances when "government demands that a landowner dedicate an easement allowing public
' 89
access to her property as a condition of obtaining a development permit.'
Read in light of Lingle, therefore, the Court's dedication exactions
opinions do not provide meaningful guidance concerning the constitutionality of other land use permit conditions, such as impact and mitigation
fees. 9 ° Yet, even after Lingle, the debate about how the rationales of
Nollan and Dolan might apply to developer fee programs continues. Indeed, a host of commentators have proposed alternative ways in which to
understand Nollan and Dolan in the post Lingle era.' 9 ' Perhaps the Court
1

Id. at 395.
Id. at 395-96.
See Nicholas & Juergensmeyer, supra note 106, at 841-44, 846-47.
187 City of Monterey v.DelMonte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687,702 (1999) (stating
that "[w]e have not extended the rough-proportionality test of Dolan beyond the special
context of exactions-land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on the
dedication of property to public use" (citation omitted)).
88
Id.at 702-05; see Nancy E. Stroud, A Review of Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey
and Its Implicationsfor Local Government Exactions, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 195,
199,
89 202-06 (2000).
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546 (2005); see id. at 546-48.
184
See Mark Fenster, RegulatoryLand Use in a ConstitutionalShadow: The Institutional
Contexts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 729-33 (2007); Daniel Pollak, Regulatory
Takings: The Supreme Court Tries to PruneAgins Without Stepping on Nollan and Dolan,
8

186
18'

31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 925, 929-31 (2006).
191 See Haskins, supra note 169, at 519-22; Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer
for the Perplexed,34 ECOLOGYL.Q.307, 369-70 (2007); Pollak, supra note 190, at 929-31;
Lauren Reznick, Note, The Deathof Nollan and Dolan? Challengingthe Constitutionality
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will someday directly address what constitutional limits apply to land use
and development conditions that impose monetary exactions. The Court
might hold that monetary exactions are not subject to takings analysis at
all.'9 2 Alternatively, the Court might develop a distinct takings analysis
governing developer fees, or it might simply confirm that they are subject
to the Penn Centralanalysis 9 ' (and other established constitutional principles, including equal protection and substantive due process, to the extent applicable in a particular circumstance). If the Court ever takes up
that task, it will certainly consult the extensive body of state law governing developer fees, just as it looked to state law in crafting Dolan's"rough
proportionality" test. 194 But before this Article turns to an analysis of the
state law principles relating to developer funding devices,' 95 the final subsection of this Part analyzes the constitutionality of sustainability fees
under Penn Central.
b.

Sustainable Development Fees under Penn Central

According to Lingle, Penn Centralgoverns any regulatory takings
challenge that does not fall within one of the other three categories.'96
Therefore, a takings challenge to a sustainable development fee program
must, at a minimum, be judged by the criteria of that case. In Penn Central,
the Court drew on previous takings decisions characterized by "essentially
ad hoc, factual inquires" that 'identified several factors that have particular

of Monetary Exactions in the Wake of Lingle v. Chevron, 87 B.U. L. REV. 725, 747-49,
755-57 (2007).
192 See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539-47 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment and dissenting in part); id. at 553-54 (Breyer, J., dissenting and joined by
Souter, J.; Ginsburg, J.; and Breyer, J.); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271
F.3d 1327, 1338-40 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that a legislative obligation to pay money,
when not from a specifically identified source, does not constitute a Fifth Amendment
taking). See also Small Prop. Owners of San Francisco v. City and County of San
Francisco, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 121, 130 n.6 (Cal. App. 2006) ("Applying the Takings Clause to
regulations that merely require the payment of money is like saying the government can
take money, but only if it pays it back. It is far more logical to conclude that a regulation
of this sort might be declared invalid as violative of due process..
193 See infra Part II.A. 1.b.
194 "Since state courts have been dealing with this question a good deal longer than we have,
we turn to representative decisions made by them." Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,
389 (1994). See also infra notes 218-227 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005)).
See infra Part II.B.
'
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005).
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significance."19' 7 Therefore, the analysis involves a balancing process rather
1 9 implies that at least
than an objective test. The word "several""
three distinct factors must be involved. The Court specified only two independent
factors, though, one of them includes a related component.19 9 Those two
factors are "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations" and "the character of the governmental
action."20 0 In later cases, the Court has continued to describe the Penn
Central principle simply by reference to those same factors. 0 1
The notion of economic impact requires little elaboration, especially given the Court's emphasis on expectations based on investment.2 °2
A regulation that does not significantly reduce the investment value of the
property should yield relatively less weight on the property owner's side
of the scale. How should a court determine the counterbalancing weight
attributable to the nature of the regulatory action? The Court's explanation of that factor offers little beyond the observation that mere regulation
is not the same thing as trespass: "A 'taking' may more readily be found
when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote
the common good. '2 3 Thus, a governmental regulation over land use that
fits within the extremely broad concept of the police power without approximating physical occupancy may survive even if it imposes a relatively
severe economic impact.20 4
The circumstances presented to the Court in Penn Central nicely
illustrate the extent to which the balancing approach shelters a police
power regulation that does not physically interfere with the property
owner's exclusive possession. Although New York City applied its landmarks preservation law in a way that severely restricted the use of the air
rights above Grand Central Station, it still left the owner of the station
197

Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).

198 Id.
99

1

Id.

Id.
See, e.g., Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39; Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 713-14 (1987);
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 174-75 (1979).
202 See Penn Central, 430 U.S. at 124-28.
20
3 Id.at 124 (citation omitted).
204 Several early cases rejected takings claims in the face of evidence that the challenged
government action caused a substantial diminution in the value of the property involved.
See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 385, 396-97 (1926); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
200

21
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with the ability to earn a reasonable return on its investment by continuing to use the property as it had been used for many years. °5 .Given
that the Court held that this extraordinary economic impact did not constitute a taking when considered in light of the city's historic preservation program,0 s it seems unlikely that the Court would find that a simple
developer fee program designed to finance sustainability objectives constitutes a regulatory taking under the Penn Central approach. In the latter
case, no less than in the former, the "interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote
the common good."2 7 Courts applying Penn Centralto developer funding
devices are consistent with this view.2"' Itis, therefore, unlikely that any
well-conceived developer fee program would constitute a taking under
Penn Central.
3.

Does the Future of Developer Fees Rest in State Law?

The Lingle opinion alone unravels a quarter century of tangled
regulatory takings doctrine.0 9 The decision reflects the Court's continuing reluctance to elevate the constitutional stature of property rights.210
But there is much more to the recent history of that story. In 2005, the

Penn Central,438 U.S. at 136.
Id.at 116-19. New York's landmark preservation statute prevented Penn Central from
executing an agreement to lease airspace to a developer proposing to build a skyscraper at
a rate of one million dollars per year during construction and three million dollars per
year after completion. Id. at 116, 136, 138.
207 Id. at 124.
208
See, e.g., Tapps Brewing Inc. v. City of Summer, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1230-31 (W.D.
Wash. 2007) (holding that a development permit condition requiring a developer to install
a stormwater line was not a taking under Penn Central);San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City and
County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 108-10 (Cal. 2002); Ehrlich v. City of Culver City,
911 P.2d 429, 450 (Cal. 1996) (approving, summarily, an "art in public places" fee based
on Penn Central).The plurality opinion in the Ehrlich case also held that a recreational
fee violated the Dolan rough proportionality test, Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 448-49, but the
analysis on that point is questionable in light of Lingle. See supra notes 160-195 and
accompanying text.
209 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538-40 (2005).
"' See Richard A. Epstein, From Penn Centralto Lingle: The Long Backwards Road, 40
J. MARSHALL L. REv. 593, 593-94 (2007) (criticizing "the consistent unwillingness of the
Supreme Court to apply the systematic view of private property that has developed on the
private law side into constitutional law."); Richard J. Lazarus, The Measureof a Justice:
Justice Scalia and the Falteringof the Property Rights Movement Within the Supreme
205

26

Court, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 759, 820-21 (2006).
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Court handed down a trilogy of takings cases that powerfully limit the role
federal courts play in overseeing state and local land use programs.
The most famous of the 2005 takings cases is Kelo v. City of New
London, which held that a city could constitutionally take private property
(upon payment of just compensation to the owner) purely for economic
development purposes.2 11 Kelo unequivocally reiterated the Court's policy
of "affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs
justify the use of the takings power. 2 12 While the case did not involve a
regulatory taking, the Court's acceptance in Kelo of legislative policies
affecting property interests1 ' fits hand-in-glove with the Court's reaffirmation in Lingle that federal courts owe considerable deference to legislative exercises of the police power that infringe on property rights.214 Taken
together, the 2005 decisions in Kelo and Lingle leave little doubt that federal courts will accede to legislative initiatives in a wide array of state and
local land use policies, including those supporting sustainable development. If the City of New London may take land from one private owner
simply to transfer it to another private owner who promises an economically advantageous development,2 1 and if the State of Hawaii may impose
a cap on the rent that Chevron may charge its lessees based on a controversial economic theory,21 6 then surely a local government may use simple
economic instruments to encourage real estate developers to adopt green
building practices.
The third takings opinion issued by the Court in 2005 even more
directly weakens federal judicial limitations on land use exaction programs. In San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco,"7
the Court resolved a narrow procedural issue in a way that should effectively prevent most regulatory takings claims from ever being heard in any
federal court. That result comes from combining federal principles of issue
preclusion with the ripeness doctrine of Williamson County Regional
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank."' Under Williamson County,
a claim that a state or local government entity has taken property without

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005).
483.
483-84.
214 See Lingle, 544 U.S. 528, 544-45.
21
5Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473-75, 483-84.
216 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 533, 535, 544-45.
217 San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
218 Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985).
211

212 I d. at
21
3 Id.at
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just compensation in violation of the Takings Clause is generally not ripe
for adjudication in federal court until the claimant has been denied compensation by a final decision in a state inverse condemnation proceeding.219 The landowners in San Remo Hotel, however, satisfied the ripeness
requirement of Williamson County, by prosecuting an inverse condemnation claim to final judgment in state court.2 2 ° Under that circumstance,
the Court held that the issue preclusion doctrine barred the landowners
from re-litigating, through a federal taking claim, those issues that were
resolved and necessary to the judgment in the state court proceeding.2 2 '
The net result is that in most instances in which a taking claim has become
ripe under Williamson County, the issues essential to the federal taking
claim will already have been finally determined against the claimant in
the state inverse condemnation action.2 22 This means that, "as a practical
matter, a significant number of plaintiffs will necessarily litigate their federal takings claims in state courts."22' 3 While the procedural disposition of
the case made a detailed consideration of the substantive legal issues unnecessary, it is interesting that the plaintiffs filed the case to challenge
a controversial San Francisco mitigation fee program.2 24
In embracing a procedural rule that directs takings cases away
from the federal district courts, the Court noted with approval that "state
courts undoubtedly have more experience than federal courts do in
resolving the complex factual, technical, and legal questions related to
zoning and land-use regulations."2 25 The opportunity for federal judicial
oversight in this field will, therefore, primarily be reserved for those
instances in which the Court itself reviews decisions of state high

219

Id. at 194-97.

Sam Remo Hotel, 544 U.S. at 340-43.
Id. at 340-43.
The Court explained that through careful litigation tactics, the petitioners could have
effectively preserved their federal claims for litigation in federal court. Id. at 338-41. This
was most clearly so with respect to the petitioners' central claim that the regulatory scheme
was facially invalid as an uncompensated taking, because the ripeness of that claim did
not require the petitioners to pursue a state court inverse condemnation proceeding. Id.
at 340-41. It is not clear, however, how realistic a bifurcated approach will be in practice
in most instances. Nor would that tactic seem to avoid the procedural dilemma for a landowner making only an as-applied taking claim when, as was the case for the petitioners,
the state constitutional principles governing the right to compensation for a regulatory
taking are essentially congruent with those of the U.S. Constitution, see id. at 332-33.
2 23
Id.at 346.
224 See infra notes 366-77 and accompanying text (discussing the state court case).
220

221
222

2 Sam Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 347.
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courts. 226

This procedural nuance will, in turn, mean that state court
opinions concerning the legality of land use exactions will generally
determine whether state and local governments may finance green
building programs through developer fees. With this prospect as background, Part II.B. explores the theories that state courts have applied to
funding techniques designed to pass infrastructure and other social costs
along to developers.
B.

State Law Limits on Land Use FundingDevices for
Sustainability

1.

Fundamental Principles

At the state and local government levels, growth management
strategies have long focused on how real estate development affects a
community's environment and the use of natural resources. 22 7 Land use
experts regularly call for new development to pay its fair share of the economic and social costs that growth imposes on society. 228 As a result, land
use law offers an established framework for judging the legitimacy of proposals to use developer funding techniques in support of land use policies. 9
This is not to say that land use law is uniform from one jurisdiction to
another, nor to suggest that the correct application of developer fee case
law to the problem of financing green building programs is obvious. But
the land use cases as a whole provide an important framework for analyzing the issues involved.

226 The Court saw this state of affairs as continuing the status quo because "most of the

cases in our takings jurisprudence... came to us on writs of certiorari from state courts
of last resort." Id.
227 See generally Robert H. Freilich & Linda Kirts Davis, Saving the Land: The Utilization
of Modern Techniques of Growth Managementto PreserveRural andAgriculturalAmerica,
13 URB. LAW. 27 (1981) (discussing how land use techniques and the state police power
can preserve rural and agricultural areas in the United States); Brian W. Ohm, Reforming
Land PlanningLegislation at the Dawn of the 21st Century: The Emerging Influence of
Smart Growth and Livable Communities, 32 URB. LAw. 181 (2000) (discussing patterns
of development, the rhetoric of "smart growth," and "livable communities" in land development planning).
22 See David L. Callies & Glenn H. Sonoda, ProvidingInfrastructurefor Smart Growth:
Land Development Conditions,43 IDAHO L. REv. 351-53 (2007); Nicholas & Juergensmeyer,
supranote 106, at 843-47; see generallyJulian Conrad Juergensmeyer & Robert Mason
Blake, Impact Fees:An Answer to Local Governments CapitalFundingDilemma, 9 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 415 (1981) (discussing impact fees and their constitutional validity).
229 See Nicholas & Juergensmeyer, note 106, at 840-43.
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Whenever local government seeks to require landowners or developers to internalize costs of land use or development that would otherwise
be externalities, two fundamental legal issues require attention. First,
what authority does the governmental body have to impose the requirement?3 ° Second, what are the legal limits of that authority?23 1
With respect to the first question, government's inherent police
power offers broad authority to impose land use regulations that serve the
interests of public health, safety, or welfare.23 2 But the existence of the
police power alone does not assure the breadth and depth of powers necessary to address effectively all sustainability objectives. 3 If the governmental body is a political subdivision with home rule or extensive charter
powers, questions of legal authority may be simplified.2 4 But if the governmental body is a political subdivision with only express powers, then the
legal authority must stem from some enabling legislation that delegates
the relevant police power functions from the state to the local governmental
body.2 35 State constitutions and legislatures typically grant near plenary
power over land use to one or more local authorities having jurisdiction
over the location of the land in question.2 36 As a result, questions of authority in this sense primarily involve the interpretation of specific state constitutional or legislative provisions relating to public controls over land
use.23 7 And, because the inherent police power of the state is so extensive,
absent narrowly defined federal constitutional restrictions on the exercise of that power, a local government that finds itself without adequate
authority to respond to an emerging land use problem only needs to gather
See Martin L. Leitner & Susan P. Schoettle, A Survey of State Impact Fee Enabling
Legislation, 25 URB. LAW. 491, 493 (1993).
230

231 See id.
22

See, e.g., Vill. of Eucidv. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,386-89 (1926) (holding zoning
to be constitutional on the basis of the state's police power); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394,410 (1915) (commenting that the police power is "one of the most essential powers
of government, one that is the least limitable'); Daddario v. Cape Cod Comm'n, 780 N.E.2d
124, 130-31 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (upholding the government's intrusive environmental
regulations); Claridge v. N.H. Wetlands Bd., 485 A.2d 287,290-92 (N.H. 1984) (holding that
the police power provided a basis for the denial of a fll permit). See generally EDWARD H.
ZIEGLER, JR. ETAL., 1 RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OFZONINGAND PLANNING § 1:2 (4th ed. 2005).
233 See, e.g., Sintra v. City of Seattle, 829 P.2d 765, 776-77 (Wash. 1992)
(holding that an
ordinance requiring a developer either to replace low income housing that would be destroyed by the proposed development or pay a housing replacement fee violated substantive due process).
234 See ZIEGLER ET AL., 1 RATHKOPF, supra note 232, § 1:9.
235 See id. §§ 1:11-:12.
236 See id. § 1:12.
237

See id.
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sufficient political support to secure from the appropriate legislative body
whatever specific authority may be missing from existing enabling acts.2"
Thus, this first issue of basic authority will rarely preclude a governmental
initiative to require internalization of the economic burdens of a perceived
socialcost associated with real estate development.23 s
The second issue concerns the proper role of developer financing devices rather than the general scope of the police power. In land use terms,
any developer financing device that takes the form of a development
approval condition may be called an exaction.24 ° State land use law, either
through legislative or judicial oversight, almost universally imposes limits
on exactions based on notions of fairness and reasonableness. 241 This simply
reflects the fundamental principle that all exercises of the police power
must be reasonable.2 4 2 In the context of land use controls, this generally
means that the regulation must be reasonably related to one of the recognized purposes of the police power-public health, safety, morals, and
general welfare.24 3
The earliest exaction cases did not involve developer fees but land
dedications required for subdivision plat approval.2 4 State law limitations
on required dedications generally reflect the philosophy that if sound planning principles indicate that a proposed development requires new or expanded public infrastructure, then the developer or landowner may be
required to dedicate to the public sufficient land to meet that demand.2 45
In effect, if the local government could properly restrain the proposed
development because of concerns over the lack of adequate land for on-site,
See id.§§ 1:2, 1:13.
As Part I discusses, however, important policy considerations may engender hotly contested political debates over the extent to which the police power should be used to promote
particular
sustainable development strategies. See supraPart I.
240
See Mark Fenster, RegulatingLand Use in a ConstitutionalShadow: The Institutional
Contexts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 733-37 (2007); see generally Carlos A. Ball &
Laurie Reynold, Exactions and Burden Distributionin Takings Cases,47 WM. &MARY L.
REv. 1513, 1516, 1522-29 (2006) (discussing negative effects ofexactions on the community).
241 See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation:
Payingfor Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REv. 177, 216-18, 221-28 (2006) (detailing
the evolution of impact fees).
242 See, e.g., Bartram v. Zoning Comm'n, 68 A.2d 308, 311-12 (Conn. 1949); City of Blue
Springs v. Gregory, 764 S.W.2d 101, 102-03 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Vill. of Hudson v.
Albrecht, Inc., 458 N.E.2d 852, 855 (Ohio 1984).
243 See, e.g., ZIEGLER ET AL., 1 RATHKOPF, supra note 232, § 1:2.
244 See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 85, at 508.
245 See, e.g., Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 207 P.2d 1, 5-8 (Cal. 1949); see generally
JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 85, at 414-22.
238
239
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public infrastructure, it could condition development approval on a
requirement that the developer dedicate the necessary land to public use
for those infrastructure purposes.24 6
Thus, the first generation exaction cases established that a city
may condition approval of a subdivision plat on the dedication of land
needed to construct those things necessary to serve the inhabitants of the
subdivision, such as suitable public streets, water lines, and sewer improvements.2 4 7 Similarly, many legislatures and courts eventually adopted
the view that a residential development that requires additional street
improvements, sewer facilities, or other infrastructure capacity may be
required to dedicate the land needed for those facilities even if they are
not for the exclusive use of residents of the development.24 s In the environmental field, state legislatures and courts have also authorized required
dedications for such purposes as preserving on-site green spaces, wetlands,
timberlands, or other natural resources.2 4 9
To what extent may development approval conditions exact contributions that go beyond the on-site infrastructure needs of the particular
project? As exaction cases evolved during the middle of the 20th century,
three more or less distinct tests emerged. The first test establishes a demanding standard that requires a direct causal connection between the
specific development and a particular infrastructure need.25 ° This is a
kind of rigid "but for" test that requires the government to show that the
proposed development alone creates the need for the additional infrastructure expenditures.25 ' By logical extension, this approach may also
mean that the additional infrastructure provided through the exaction
must be used solely to benefit the proposed development." 2 The most wellrecognized articulation of this test comes from a 1961 case in which the
246

JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 85, at 415-16.
247 See, e.g., Garvin v. Baker, 59 So.2d 360, 364-65 (Fla. 1952); Ridgefield Land Co. v.
Detroit, 217 N.W. 58, 59 (Mich. 1928).
248 See, e.g., Mefford v. City of Tulare, 228 P.2d 847, 848-51 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951);
Colborne v. Vill. of Corrales, 739 P.2d 972, 973-74 (N.M. 1987).
249 See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 85, at 411-13 (summarizing the cluster
subdivision technique, which requires dedication of open space to conserve such resources
as green space and forests); Nicholas & Juergensmeyer, supranote 106,854-57 (discussing
wetland mitigation banking programs).
250
See Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 801-02 (Ill.
1961).
251 Id. at 802.
252 See GulestAssocs., Inc. v. Town of Newburgh, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729, 732-33(N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1960), affd, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962), overruled by Jenad, Inc. v. Vill. of
Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966).
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Illinois Supreme Court held that a village could not require a subdivider
to dedicate land for infrastructure facilities unless "the burden cast upon
the subdivider is specifically and uniquely attributable" to the proposed
development.2 53 Because so many infrastructure needs result from the
aggregate impact of multiple projects over time, this analysis makes it
impossible to require a project to internalize its proportionate share of
the most significant social costs of new development.
In direct contrast to the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test,
other cases during this same time period applied to exaction conditions the
same highly deferential standard that courts traditionally used to determine whether most routine exercises of the policy power are legal.254 This
test, which invokes a simple reasonableness standard, merely requires a
court to determine whether the governmental regulation has "any reasonable tendency to promote the public morals, health, or safety, or the public
2 5 The reasonableness test is reminiscent
comfort, welfare, or prosperity.""
of, and is sometimes expressly categorized as, a substantive due process
standard. 6 In direct contrast to the "specifically and uniquely attributable"

Vill. of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d at 802. For the remainder of this Article the
Village of Mount Prospect Court's language will be used to refer to this test, generally,
as the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test.
254
See, e.g., Jenad,218 N.E.2d at 676-77; Billings Props., Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394
P.2d 182, 186-87 (Mont. 1964). The course taken by the New York courts illustrates the
sometimes tentative manner in which exaction analysis developed. Jenad overruled
Gulest Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Newburgh, which had temporarily placed New York in the
"specifically and uniquely attributable" camp. Jenad, 218 N.E.2d at 675. Later, the New
York Court of Appeals observed that Jenadwas "partially abrogated" by Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 387 (1994). Twin Lakes Dev. Corp. v. Town of Monroe, 801 N.E.2d
821, 826 (N.Y. 2003). This may mean that New York moved from the rigid "specifically
and uniquely attributable" camp to the far more relaxed reasonable relationship standard
and, finally, to the majority rule that applies the rational nexus test to all forms of exactions, see infra notes 258-63 and accompanying text. But, as more fully developed later in
this Article, after Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005), it is more accurate
to say that Dolan conflicts with the reasonable relationship test only as applied to land
dedication exactions and not with respect to developer fees. See infra notes 322-73 and
accompanying text. The history of New York's exactions analysis is made even more
complex by the fact that Jenadcited with approval both the Montana Supreme Court's
"rational relationship" analysis in Billings Properties,Inc. and the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's opinion in Jordanv. Vill. of Menomonee Falls,137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1966), which
is often considered to be the origin of rational nexus analysis, see, e.g., Rosenberg, supra
note 241, at 224. See Jenad, 218 N.E. 2d at 676.
255 State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 196 N.W. 451, 454 (Wis. 1923).
256 See, e.g., Petterson v. City of Naperville, 137 N.E.2d 371, 378-79 (Ill. 1956).
253
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test, when a court applies the reasonableness standard, it will nearly
always uphold the challenged exaction." 7
The most common test applied to exactions, however, is significantly more demanding than the reasonableness standard, yet it is decid25 8
edly less restrictive than the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test.
This third test, which is now followed in most jurisdictions, 2 59 in some
form, is sometimes called2the
"dual rational nexus" test or, more simply,
°
test.
nexus"
"rational
the
Rational nexus analysis requires not merely that the exaction must
be reasonably related to a valid police power purpose but that the particular requirement must bear a demonstrable connection to an identified
social cost that the proposed project imposes.2 6 ' Under this test, government cannot simply use the developer's request for project approval as a
convenient opportunity to fund general costs associated with growth.2 62
"The distinction... is whether the requirement has some
reasonable relationship or nexus to the use to which the
property is being made or is merely being used as an excuse for taking property simply because at that particular
moment the landowner is asking the city for some license
26
or permit.""
Through its "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" standards, the
Supreme Court has effectively adopted a version of the dual rational
nexus test as the standard that the Fifth Amendment imposes on land
dedication exactions. 2

257
258
25 9

26

Rosenberg, supra note 241, at 223-24.
Id. at 225-28.
Id.

at 226.

See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,389-91 (1994) (reviewing the three principle
tests that state courts applied to land use exactions); Nicholas & Juergensmeyer, supra
note 106, at 841-43. The term "rational nexus test" will be used to refer to this test for
the remainder of this Article.
261 Rosenberg, supra note 241, at 225-27.
262 See id. Note the analogy here to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See supra
notes 157-198 and accompanying text. In the context ofrational nexus analysis, however,
there is no need to characterize the extortionate bargain as a burden on constitutionally
protected rights; it is enough for the court to conclude more generally that the bargain is
an unreasonable exercise of the police power. Fenster, supra note 240, 753-54.
263 Simpson v. City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1980).
24
r See supranotes 159-85 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Skoro v. City of Portland, 544
F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D.Ore. 2008) (applying the essential nexus and rough proportionality
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A key consequence of the rational nexus test is the development
of a distinct rational nexus calculus. This requires that the government
account for the infrastructure needs to which the project contributes and
develop and apply a valid formula for determining the proportionate share
of those needs that are properly attributable to the project.26 5 Under a
rational nexus analysis, a local government typically must have legitimate
cost studies and proportionate share formulae to back up the precise exactions demanded.2" Thus, in comparison to the vague reasonableness standard that applies to other exercises of the police power, the rational nexus
test calls for heightened judicial scrutiny of exaction conditions.6 7
While careful planning often leads to land dedication conditions
that pass rational nexus scrutiny,26 8 the logical limitations of on-site land
dedications are obvious. A particular development might independently
accommodate needed water treatment facilities, a community park, or
even a new school within the boundaries of the proposed development site,
but another development, which also burdens the community's existing
infrastructure facilities, might not.269 Faced with this reality, local governments rather quickly developed the alternative of charging a development fee in lieu of a land dedication. 270 At least to the extent that the fee
is calculated on a formula that charges the developer a share of the costs
proportionate to the benefit of the infrastructure to the new development,
most courts faced with the question readily made the transition from
required dedication to required payment in lieu.27 '

tests to an adjudicatory dedication exaction).
265 Rosenberg, supra note 241, at 225-27.
26 Nicholas & Juergensmeyer, supra note 106, at 843-45, 860-61.
267 Compare supra notes 232-39 and accompanying text (describing judicial treatment of
state police power), with Nicholas & Juergensmeyer, supranote 106, at 842-43 (describing
the two prongs that must be satisfied in order for an impact fee to survive the rational
nexus test).
26 Nicholas &Juergensmeyer, supranote 106, at 844 (describing the analyses that precede
impact fees typically upheld by courts).
269 See Rosenberg, supra note 241, at 201-03 (discussing the origins of the practice of
obtaining
funds from developers for off-site improvements).
27 0

Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra 228, at 418; see Divan Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd.,
334 A.2d 30 (N.J. 1975) (holding that a requirement that a developer pay for part of an
off-site school was improper because other property owners who would benefit were not
required to contribute; Jordan v. VilL of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965)
(upholding the legality of a fee imposed in lieu of a dedication).
271 See, e.g., Divan Builders, 334 A.2d at 38-41. The obvious exception arises when the
applicable enabling act proves inadequate for the purpose. See, e.g., N.J. Builders Ass'n v.
Mayor of Bernards Twp., 528 A.2d 555, 562 (N.J. 1987).
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But a fee literally paid in lieu of a dedication of land required to
support the extra infrastructure demands created by a single development
suffers from logical limits similar to those affecting an on-site dedication
requirement. Additional public utility facilities, as well as new schools and
parks, off-site traffic control enhancements, and many other infrastructure
improvements, will, in fact, be added, under many circumstances, only because of the actual or projected aggregate demand for them, as a community grows. 2 Moreover, the costs of the required capital improvements for
the infrastructure facilities often far exceed the land costs. 273 Therefore,
in due course, the development impact fee gained widespread acceptance
across the nation to allow local government authorities to collect from
developers the proportionate costs of the basic infrastructure demands of
their developments.2 7 4 Where enabling legislation proved insufficient for
the purpose, legislatures have commonly expanded the governing statutes, 275 and many courts, at times with difficulty, have adopted statutory
interpretations and police power analyses to match.2 76
Impact fee programs, to a far greater extent than required dedications and payment-in-lieu systems, raise serious questions about the extent to which the land use regulation process may properly be used to fund
public facilities. One of the main objections to the use of impact fees is that
they can serve as disguised and discriminatory taxation against new development to pay for facilities that inure to the benefit of the public at large.2 77
The net result under modern land use law, in many jurisdictions, has been
the adoption of a distinctly rigorous rational nexus analysis that requires

272 See JUERGENSMEYER &ROBERTS, supra note 85, at 414-16.
273 See, e.g., Mary Josey Glover, School Bond List Remains Up in the Air, NEWS & REC,
Oct. 15,2007, http://newsrecord.com/content/2007/10/15/article/schoolbondlist-remains
up-in-the-air (describing an estimate for a school construction plan that has an estimated
cost of $80.5 million with only $4.2 to 11.2 million of that sum coming from the cost of land).
274 See Nicholas & Juergensmeyer, supra note 106, at 842.
275 See, e.g., Olson et al., The Future of Impact Fees in Minnesota, 24 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 635, 643-44 (1998) (describing an expansion of power through enabling legislation
in Illinois).
271 See, e.g., City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126 P.3d 802, 804-07 (Wash. 2006) (upholding
a traffic impact fee based on a state enabling act); Cherokee County v. Greater Atlanta
Homebuilders Ass'n, 566 S.E.2d 470, 472 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (approving impact fees for
libraries, roads, and parks and recreation assessed pursuant to Georgia's impact fee
legislation).
277
See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 85, at 418 (discussing an early challenge
to in lieu fees).
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a demonstrable connection between the fee charged and the impact that
2 78
the development has on public infrastructure costs.
While the exact formulation and the degree of rigor in the application of the standard varies from one jurisdiction to another, the basic
principle underlying this test for the legitimacy of an impact fee is that
"(1) impact fees may be no more than the government's infrastructure
costs that are reasonably attributable to the new development and (2) the
development required to pay the fee must derive some benefit from the use
of the fees collected. 2 79 One of the most important aspects of the rational
nexus test as applied in many jurisdictions is that it allows a land use
authority to create a reasonable opportunity to distribute a wide range
of infrastructure costs on a pro rata basis among developers.
In its most rigorous form, rational nexus analysis requires an impact fee program to satisfy at least three conditions that invite courts to
engage in a demanding means-ends review. First, the government authority must undertake a comprehensive and empirically valid study to establish the true relationship between new development and the community's
infrastructure requirements and other public needs."' Second, the impact fee program must establish a legitimate formula for determining the
proportionate impact that a particular development has on those needs."'
And third, the program must have a system to account for fees collected
that shows that the funds are actually used to address the particular needs
involved. 8 2 Additionally, in many jurisdictions, an impact fee program
should generally be consistent with any comprehensive plan adopted by
the jurisdiction. 8 The net result of this approach is that land use authorities, anticipating that developers will aggressively challenge the methodology used, routinely engage in highly structured and thoroughly documented
28 4
impact fee analysis in advance of adopting an impact fee scheme.

See, e.g., Drebick, 126 P.3d at 809 (summarizing the process and formula established
under the city's road impact fee ordinance).
279 Nicholas & Juergensmeyer, supra note 106, at 843.
280 See Jordan v. Vill. of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442, 447-48 (Wis. 1965).
281See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 85, at 526-27.
282 See id. at 538.
278

283

See id. at 518. See also Save Our Septic Systems Comm., Inc. v. Sarasota County, 957

So.2d 671,673-75 (Fla. Dist. CtApp. 2007) (analyzing a challenge to a central sewer system
capacity
fee in light of Florida's comprehensive planning requirement).
2
1 See, e.g., JAMES C. NICHOLAS, ARTHUR C. NELSON, & JULLAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER,
A PRACITIONER'S GUIDE TO DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES 224-56 (American Planning Ass'n)
(1991) (providing a comprehensive model development impact fee administrative code).
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Because the social costs of land development are not limited to traditional infrastructure requirements, the primary developer funding devices
of contemporary land use regulation also extend beyond land dedications,
in-lieu fees, and impact fees to include two other common forms of developer funding-the linkage fee and the mitigation fee.2" 5 The conventional
view is that rational nexus analysis applies to linkage and mitigation fees
in generally the same way that it applies to impact fees.2 86
A linkage fee reflects the public policy that because a well-planned
community requires assets and resources in addition to traditional or hard
infrastructure, a new development may also be required to contribute its
fair share to fund what may be called soft infrastructure needs. 2 v The
underlying notion is that growth impacts not only a community's need
for adequate streets and sewers, but also its legitimate desire for such
amenities as open spaces and public artwork, and such social resources
as decent housing for a growing workforce and accessible child care.2 88
Thus, in some states, municipalities may impose linkage fees to offset the
costs of such community needs as low income housing that may be necessary to accommodate the workforce associated with land development,
as well as amenities such as beautification programs for public places
at a level that the community judges appropriate in light of its general
population growth.28 9
While a linkage fee helps to fund a community facility (soft infrastructure), a mitigation fee compensates for harm (social cost) attributable
to development.2 9 ° State and local government authorities use mitigation
285 See generally JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 85, at 540-45.
28 See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
87 See JUERGENSMEYER &ROBERTS, supranote 85, at 540-41. See also William W. Merrill IlI

& Robert K Lincoln, Linkage Fees and FairShare Regulations:Law and Method, 25 URB.
LAW. 223, 223-26 (1993); Fred P. Bosselman & Nancy E. Stroud, Mandatory Tithes: The
Legality of Land Development Linkage, 9 NOVAL. J. 381, 390-92 (1985).
21 See James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, A Limitation on Development Impact
Exactions to Limit Social Policy-Making:Interpretingthe Takings Clause to Limit Land
Use Policy-Makingfor Social Welfare Goals of Urban Communities, 9 DICK. J. ENVTL L.
& POLVY 1, 19-23, 20 n.32, 20 n.34, 20 n.36 (2000) (discussing the use of exactions as a
means
of furthering social policy goals).
289
See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 450 (Cal. 1996) (upholding a municipal
ordinance requiring developers to contribute to the city's fund for art in public places or
to place art on site); John J. Delaney et al., The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test for
Validating Subdivision Exactions, User Impact Fees and Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 139, 143-44 (1987).
29 See Nicholas & Juergensmeyer, supra note 106, at 858-59 (discussing the appropriate
uses of linkage fees and mitigation fees).
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fees especially to fund environmental protection programs, such as wildlife and forestry preservation, thereby offsetting the adverse environmental
impact of development.2 91 As is further considered in the discussion that
follows, sustainable development initiatives may use any of the developer
funding devices described here, but mitigation fees present the most promising alternative.2 9 2 They also raise the issues of greatest interest for purposes of this Article.
2.

Using Developer Fees to Fund Sustainable Development
Programs

A community might require a developer to dedicate an interest in
the project site for sustainability purposes, as occurs, at least indirectly,
under a common ordinance that mandates preservation of a portion of
existing woodlands.29 Similarly, a community might find opportunities
to fund its sustainability objectives through in-lieu payments, impact fees,
or linkage fees. For example, a city that has adopted a tree preservation
plan may offer developers the option to make a payment to the city's tree
preservation fund in lieu of dedicating a portion of the site to preserve
existing trees.2 94 Likewise, a local government that wishes to preserve
natural resources might charge an impact fee to every developer to fund
a proportionate contribution to publicly owned facilities or programs for
the preservation or protection of those resources.295 Or a community might
charge linkage fees to office building and industrial park developers to pay
for improvements to public transportation facilities in an effort to achieve
reduced greenhouse gas emissions targets for private cars.29 s
See Thomas W. Ledman, Note, Local Government Environmental Mitigation Fees:
Development Exactions, the Next Generation,45 FLA. L. REV. 835, 854-56 (1993).
292 See infra Part II.B.3.
293 See ZIEGLER, 1 RATHKOPF, supra note 232, at § 20:27.
294 See id. § 20:60.
29' Green building programs that use the feebate device implicitly adopt this approach.
See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text. See also Kingsley, supranote 1, at 549-55
(proposing impact fees based on a project's level of LEED certification or some measure of
costs associated with the use of specific resources). Cf. Bd. of Trs. v. Keystone
Conversions, L.L.C., 103 P.3d 686, 687-92 (Utah 2004) (addressing whether a water
district's "water availability fee" was subject to statutory requirements applicable to
impact fees).
29 Cf. Michael B. Gerrard, Climate Change and the Environmental Impact Review
Process, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 2008, at 20, 22 (discussing a settlement of a
lawsuit against San Bernardino County, California that mentions consideration for the
county to include in its general growth plan "transportation impact fees on developments
291
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While dedications, in-lieu payments, impact fees, and linkage fees
all can, therefore, address some significant sustainability objectives, they
cannot serve as the main funding devices for public sustainability programs, at least not as long as land use controls are primarily local and
many of the most important sustainability problems require regional and
global solutions. Unless and until individual communities can assure local
sustainability that is unaffected by global ecological circumstances-and
then, only if each geographic region is unconcerned with sustainability
beyond its borders-required dedications, in-lieu payments, and impact
and linkages fees will be inadequate to achieve some key sustainability
objectives. The main function of a broadly conceived green building program should be to achieve sustainability rather than merely to provide for
local infrastructure (whether hard or soft). Mitigation fees offer a promising mechanism for requiring real estate developers to compensate for
much of the ecological harm that real estate development causes and that
threatens to make construction activity as currently done unsustainable
from a trans-generational and global perspective. As the next section
suggests, mitigation fees may even offer an effective means to finance the
most progressive sustainability initiatives that address the international
social justice objectives of the sustainability movement.
3.

Using Mitigation Fees to Fund Sustainable Development
Programs

While the precise limits of mitigation fees under state land use law
remain to be tested,29 7 and the status of environmental mitigation fees is
unclear or undeveloped in many jurisdictions, one common view maintains
that all mitigation fee programs must satisfy roughly the same rational
nexus test that applies to impact fees.29 In 2003, Professors Nicholas and
Juergensmeyer asserted that, for purposes of exaction analysis, "[t]oday
the weight of opinion is that there are no fundamental differences between"2 traditional impact fees and developer fees used to finance "'green'
infrastructure items. 3 °° In keeping with this framework, they concluded
that "any environmental mitigation fees would need very careful impact

that fund public transit").
297 See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 85, at 543.
298 See Nicholas & Juergensmeyer, supra note 106, at 861.
299Id. at 846.
3
00

Id. at 847.
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analysis in order to make them feasible and defensible." '' Thus, they
observed that under an environmental mitigation fee program developers
"can be charged a proportionate share of the impact cost of the development
on the environment or the preservation of the environment" but "cannot
3 2
be charged any more than their demonstrated proportionate share.""
In their article, Nicholas and Juergensmeyer focused primarily on
how environmental mitigation fees and tradeable emissions and wetlands
mitigation programs might serve as models for market-based alternatives for achieving more broadly conceived environmental protection objectives. 0 3 They did not discuss sustainability or green building programs
specifically. Assuming, however, that the rational nexus analysis of the
leading impact fee cases30 4 also applies to environmental mitigation fees,
Professors Nicholas's and Juergensmeyer's concise recipe should be equally
valid to assure legality of sustainable construction and green building fees.
They explained that "[a]ny effective regulatory program will require
three things: [f]irst, the specification of a level of service; [s]econd, incorporation into a comprehensive plan; and, [t]hird, the adoption of regulations
that maintain the level of service in accordance with that comprehensive
plan."30 5 In this context, "level of service" refers to quantifiable environmental objectives (or for present purposes, sustainability objectives) that
the community establishes.3 6 Because Professors Nicholas and
Juergensmeyer were writing in the pre-Lingle era, they had no occasion
to consider whether Lingle has now freed state courts from constitutionally dictated bondage to a rigid rational nexus analysis.30 7 That question
is the ultimate subject of this Article.30 8
Reserving that larger question for the time being, this section
proceeds from the perspective outlined by Professors Nicholas and

301 Id.
302

Id.

at 860.
at 861. As explained, the rational nexus test requires both that an impact fee

cannot exceed the cost reasonably attributable to the project and that the project must
derive a benefit from the fee. See supranotes 241-67 and accompanying text. A mitigation
fee presumably satisfies the second prong ofthe test because the mitigation program makes
it possible for the development to proceed even though it will cause environmental harm
that, without mitigation, would be a sufficient basis for denial of development approval.
303 See generally Nicholas & Juergensmeyer, supra note 106.
304 See supra notes 259-287, and accompanying
text.
305 Nicholas & Juergensmeyer, supra note 106, at 859.
306

See id. at 844-45.

307 The Lingle decision was written in 2005, which was after the Nicholas and

Juergensmeyer article was published in 2003. See id. and Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,
544 U.S. 528 (2005).
3M See infra notes 313-17 and accompanying text.
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Juergensmeyer, to analyze how and to what extent mitigation fees imposed on developers might fund public sustainability initiatives in accordance with a rigorous rational nexus standard. This section also considers
unique policy questions involved in financing sustainable development
objectives through developer fees. The discussion moves from programs
that involve relatively low costs and little controversy to those that are
increasingly expensive, and finally to those that are both expensive and
controversial. Throughout the discussion, it is important to keep in mind
that mitigation fees are not merely sources of funds, but they can and
frequently will operate as economic instruments to influence the market
behavior of real estate developers.0 9
Among the lowest cost and least controversial green building initiatives are those that merely advocate and promote sustainable design and
construction standards through public awareness and educational programs or through recognition and awards to green projects.1 l Even these
programs, however, require some minimal level of funding for administrative purposes, informational brochures, announcements, and public meetings and ceremonies."' Can and should government authorities fund
programs of this type by charging mitigation fees to developers? In some
jurisdictions, of course, mitigation fees for such novel purposes might
require enabling legislation.3 1 2 Assuming the necessary authority exists,
is there any other reason why a municipality could not legitimately fund
these minimal expenses through a sustainable construction mitigation
fee that presumes that all projects in the community will benefit from a
public program to promote sustainability? After all, given the evolving
state of sustainable construction technology, even the most technologically advanced green developer can probably use an additional sustainability resource, and it should be feasible to devise a simple assessment
formula to assure that each development bears only a modest share of
the costs involved.
As a matter of public policy, an economic basis for using mitigation
fees for these purposes probably exists. But a rigorous rational nexus
review may suggest that assessments made under these circumstances are
more in the nature of taxes for the general welfare than legitimate development fees. 1 Recall that rational nexus analysis requires that the authority

309

310
311
312

See JUERGENSMEYER

& ROBERTS, supra note

85, at 544.

See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
See Rosenberg, supra note 241, at 220-21.

3 See Rosenberg, supra note 241, at 219-20. Cf. Emerson Coll. v. City of Boston, 462
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collecting the developer fees use them for purposes that benefit, in some
proportionate way, the developers who pay them.3 14 Under environmental
mitigation fee logic, the implicit assumption is that the benefit to the
developer comes from the fact that, by offsetting the environmental harm
that the project causes, the mitigation program allows the developer to
proceed with the project without having to avoid that harm.3 15 In what
sense do programs promoting and recognizing green building projects
benefit developers who choose not to adopt green building techniques?
Moreover, what formula could be devised to show that the fee charged to
a specific developer bears an acceptable relationship to any adverse effects that the developer's project causes? To the extent that programs of
this nature primarily benefit the public at large and do not offset quantifiable burdens imposed on the community by new development, under a
rigorous rational nexus analysis it may be inappropriate to use mitigation fees to finance broad-based green building promotional activities.3 16
Furthermore, programs of such limited scope are unlikely to be supported
by the kind of empirical data and precise calculus that conventional impact
analysis requires.3 17
A number of somewhat more costly green building programs that
directly benefit the development community may be far better candidates
for funding through mitigation fees. In this category we may include a wide
range of development preferences for green projects, such as expedited
plan review and processing, reduced application fees or fee rebates, and
development concessions in the form of height or density bonuses. Even
the least expensive of these initiatives, such as expedited plan review and
modest development bonus programs, involve some administrative costs,
and the others either require the government authority to forego revenue
or to incur potentially increased social costs associated with more intense
development for green projects.3 18 While conventional developers who
choose not to participate in these preference programs do not benefit
N.E.2d 1098, 1102-06 (Mass. 1984) (holding that a special fire service availability fee
charged to the owners of certain buildings was more in the nature of an unauthorized tax
than a permissible fee).
314 See supra notes 279-83 and accompanying text.
315 See supra note 302.
311 See id. See also Rosenberg, supra note 241, at 225-28 (discussing the requirements of
the rational nexus test).
317 See Nicholas & Juergensmeyer, supra note 106, at 844. Of course, assuming that the
land use authority gathers some minimal supporting data, a rational nexus approach
might permit at least some portion of the costs of such programs to be financed in this way.
318 See supra notes 39-57 and accompanying text.
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directly from them, under environmental harm mitigation logic the program could assess fees against those developers based on calculations of
(1) social costs associated with specific design and construction practices
that the conventional developers follow that are less sustainable than the
preferred green practices and (2) the costs of mitigating those social costs
through sustainable design and construction practices on other projects.
For example, with the help of appropriate environmental cost accounting,
a sustainability mitigation program could conceivably establish a unit
social cost associated with greenhouse gas emissions or life-cycle waste
from particular building types that could be mitigated by specific sustainable design and construction techniques for which studies could also
determine costs. The policy judgment involved would be that conventional
developments can legitimately be required to offset the social costs of their
less sustainable practices by providing funding for more sustainable projects. Conceptually, this is the same rationale that many wetlands mitigation programs follow, and it parallels similar mitigation fee proposals for
other ecological objectives. 19
This approach may not only make it financially feasible for more
communities to implement development incentives for sustainable construction, but it may also point the way toward more efficient decisions
by developers with respect to green building practices. Rational economic
analysis suggests that developers who can incorporate the desired green
features into their projects for less than the cost of the mitigation fee will
do so, while those who cannot, may choose to avoid sustainable construction practices that are inefficient for their projects by paying to incentivize the more sustainable practices of developers in the first category." ° In
theory, thorough industry research and economic calculus could ultimately
achieve an optimal reallocation of the costs of sustainable construction
practices to the group of developers best able to bear them. But, if courts
adhering to rational nexus analysis require too much precision in quantifying the adverse effects of a particular development that threaten sustainability objectives, it may be extremely difficult for a community to prove
that a proposed mitigation fee is no greater than that project's proportionate contribution to the social costs of unsustainability.
See Nicholas & Juergensmeyer, supra note 106, at 852-58; see, e.g., Ann E. Mudge,
Impact Fees for Conversion ofAgricultural Land: A Resource-Based Development Policy
for California'sCitiesand Counties, 19 ECOLOGYL.Q. 63, 66-73 (1992) (proposing farmland
mitigation fees).
320 Cf. Nicholas & Juergensmeyer, supra note 106, at 855 (discussing the economic
efficiency advantages of offsite wetland mitigation).
319
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A recent case involving a traditional dedication exaction provides
a helpful framework for considering just how demanding rational nexus
analysis might be when applied to a sustainable development mitigation
fee. In applying the proportionality prong of the standard to a county road
dedication requirement, the Utah Supreme Court held that the exaction
could be lawful only if the cost that the exaction imposed on the developer
was "roughly equivalent" to the cost of the related impact that the development imposed on the county.3 2 ' Using this concept of proportionality, the
court explained that a "proportion of 1 to 1.01 is roughly equivalent, while
' While the court did not say precisely how
the proportion of I to 3 is not."322
low the ratio must be, the opinion required the trial court to make a determination that the costs of the exaction and the impact would be "about
the same. 3 23 The court remanded the case to the trial court for a two part
impact analysis.32 4 The first step would be to "determine whether the
exaction and impact are related in nature-or whether the solution (the
exaction) directly addresses the specific problem (the impact)."32 5 Because
the case involved a conventional requirement for an on-site road dedication
to address the proposed development's anticipated traffic impact,32 6 this
part of the analysis presented no special challenge. The second part of
the trial court's task, however, would require precise evidentiary development to "determine what the cost of dealing with the impact would be to
the County, absent any exaction; what the cost of the exaction would be
to the developer; and whether the two costs are roughly equivalent." '2 7
In the unremarkable context of the Utah case-a simple road dedication exaction-the task was demanding but entirely feasible.32 sMarket
forces continually confirm land values, and traffic engineers routinely
determine the costs associated with accommodating increased traffic

B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 196 P.3d 601, 603 (Utah 2008). While the
court was expressly referring to Dolan's "rough proportionality" requirement, which,
therefore, concerned the constitutionality of the exaction under the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause, the court noted that the Dolanformula was, in substance, the same as "the
'reasonable relationship' test, then being used in Utah and the majority of other states"
to determine whether a dedication exaction was legal under state law. Id. (quoting Dolan
v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994)).
322
321

Id.

323
324
325

326

327

Id. at 604.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 602.
B.A.M., 196 P.3d at 604.

328 See generally id. at 602-04.
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associated with new development.32 9 Given the current state of environmental economics, however, this kind of mathematical precision may be
impractical for purposes of requiring a particular real estate development to shoulder a reasonably proportionate share of the adverse effects
of unsustainable design and construction practices.3 0 In theory, however,
land use authorities might be able to develop this kind of impact analysis
in support of some of the most popular green building incentives, such as
expedited plan review, reduced fees, or density bonuses for green projects,
which require relatively modest and easily
calculated expenditures to
3 31
cover additional administrative costs.
Assuming the feasibility of the necessary impact studies and calculations, a similar legal and economic analysis might also support the
use of mitigation fees for more costly green building programs, such as
reimbursements for the costs of green building certifications, tax credits
or grants to offset costs of energy efficient systems and other capital expenditures to meet green building standards, or subsidized financing for such
expenditures. 3 2 For economic reasons already suggested,3 33 using mitigation fees in this way may prove preferable to command and control regulations that mandate green building standards for all projects.3 34 Some
development types or sites may be less able to incorporate green building
standards than others.3 35 For example, many cities have decided to set a
targeted level of greenhouse gas emissions for the entire city that are significantly below currently projected levels for the target date. 33 6 Under a
See, e.g., NICHOLAS, NELSON, & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 284, 175-88 (offering a
model impact fee ordinance for roads).
330 See id. at 61-66 (demonstrating how economic costs are determined for impact fee
purposes). To determine the social costs of unsustainable building practices, one must
have an economically valid method for determining the present value of such complex
adverse consequences as a remote generation's loss of the earth's capacity to handle
pollution at a future time. See generallyRICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMicANALYSISOFLAW
403-04 (7th ed. 2007) (discussing the application of cost-benefit analysis to
environmental concerns).
331 See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
332 See supra notes 64-84 and accompanying text.
333
See generally ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
171-84 (Richard L. Revesz et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) (comparing command
and control regulations to economic incentives at a macro level).
31 See supra notes 319-20 and accompanying text.
331 Cf. ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 333, at 182-84 (discussing how command and
control models may limit the use of alternative means of mitigating residual pollution in
production processes, while economic incentives allow for flexibility to achieve similar
levels of success).
36 Irma S. Russell & Jeffery S. Dennis, State and Local Governments Address the Twin
329
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mitigation fee system, projects for which emissions reductions may be relatively costly or even infeasible would not need to incur inefficient costs for
that purpose because they would pay offsetting mitigation fees that fund
resources for projects that can achieve significant emissions reductions at
lower costs.
Mitigation fees determined in this way might even provide a local
solution to the substantial and challenging global problem of preserving
natural capital indefinitely for remote future generations. For this purpose, natural capital refers to:
"non-renewable resources, such as mineral resources; the
finite capacity of the natural system to produce 'renewable
resources' such as food crops and water supply; and the
capacity of natural systems to absorb the emissions and pollutants that arise from human actions without side effects
that imply heavy costs passed onto future generations."33' 7
Just as every real estate development, no matter how well planned and
executed, imposes some social costs by increasing the demands on public
infrastructure,"' so too do all contemporary real estate developments
threaten global sustainability to some extent by contributing to the exhaustion of the earth's natural capital. The most advanced green building standards currently in use merely contemplate development that is
more sustainable through construction practices that do significantly less
harm than conventional techniques; these standards do not yet conceive
of real estate development that literally has no adverse effect on the ability
of future generations to meet their needs.33 9 Moreover, even an ideally
green project that generates all of its own energy and uses the most efficient techniques currently imaginable in such diverse matters as efficient
water systems, sustainable landscaping, and natural habitat preservation,
would inevitably use some non-renewable natural resources, generate some
amount of construction debris, and would eventually make demands on
disposal facilities at the end of its useful life. If, as some would argue, the
concepts of ever-expanding economic development and sustainability are

Challengesof ClimateChangeand EnergyAlternatives,NAT. RESOURCES &ENV'T, Summer
2008, at 9, 10 (discussing the U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement).
337
Yosef Jabareen, A Knowledge Map for Describing Variegatedand Conflict Domains of
SustainableDevelopment, 47 J. ENVTL. PLAN. &MGMT. 623,628 (2004) (citation omitted).
" See supra notes 286-89 and accompanying text.
339 See Circo, supra note 11, at 756-62.
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ultimately inconsistent with one another because economic development
is approaching the limits of the earth's carrying capacity, 340 one possible
solution may be to assess a sustainability mitigation fee against virtually
every new real estate development project to fund a long-term natural capital replacement reserve. Environmentalists and environmental economists
will, however, hotly debate whether or to what extent human investment
can replace natural capital.3 41 Under a rational nexus analysis, therefore,
a land use authority aiming at these lofty goals would face the daunting
task of placing a credible monetary value on the long-term ecological harm
attributable to specific projects.
Perhaps the final-and potentially the most expensive and controversial-frontier for sustainable development that mitigation fees might
address, involves the global social justice objectives of the international
sustainability movement.3 42 Whether land use controls can or should be
used in service of these progressive-some would say radical-objectives,
either as a matter of state land use law or the Federal Constitution, is a
question outside the scope of this Article.3 43 To the extent that local communities, regions, individual states, or the United States as a whole may
wish to work toward future economic development, including in the field
of real estate, that achieves a more equitable distribution of wealth across
the globe and that ensures that remote future generations have the opportunity to enjoy an equitable level of social welfare, it will be necessary to
finance an enormous capital resource. Such a resource will be necessary to
benefit the poorest regions of the earth and future generations. At least
in theory, mitigation fees assessed against all new development, including
all real estate use and occupancy, could help establish the magnitude of
capital required for that extraordinary purpose.
To have a truly global effect, however, a mitigation fee program
of this scope would require legislation and treaties at national and international levels. Furthermore, whenever mitigation fees are proposed to
address broad social problems, the scent of illegal, discriminatory taxes
on real estate developers may be noted.3 44 Even giving these significant
See generally George Ledec et al., Carrying Capacity Population Growth, and
SustainableDevelopment, in Rapid Population Growth and Human Carrying Capacity:
Two Perspectives 41(Dennis J. Mahar ed., The World Bank 1985).
"' See Jan van Geldrop & Cees Withagen, Natural Capital and Sustainability, 32
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 445 (2000); Richard W. England, Should We PursueMeasurement of
the Natural Capital Stock, 27 ECOLOLOGICAL ECON. 257 (1998).
342 Circo, Does SustainabilityRequire, supra note 105.
" For such a discussion, see id.
344 See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
340
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hurdles their due, however, it may not be entirely fanciful to imagine a
sustainable development strategy that effectively incorporates locally
administered sustainability mitigation fees into a much broader solution.
In summary, mitigation fee programs hold definite promise as practical devices to finance progressive green building programs designed to
provide potent incentives to move the real estate industry toward more
sustainable design and construction practices. But, if these programs must
satisfy the same rigorous rational nexus analysis that currently applies to
impact fees in many jurisdictions, government must overcome substantial
technical hurdles.3 45 A critical question remains to be considered at this
point: Is an alternative legal analysis available to legitimize mitigation fees
for sustainability purposes even if it is not feasible to establish a "rational
nexus"-as that term is used for impact fee purposes 34 6 -between a community's sustainability objectives and the quantifiable adverse impacts
that new development has on sustainability?
4.

Is a Reasonable Relationship Sufficient to Justify Sustainable
Development Fees?

Prior to the development of the Supreme Court's exaction jurisprudence, under certain circumstances some state courts judged the
legality of development exactions under a simple reasonable relationship
standard. 347 That standard reflects the most common judicial restriction
on the exercise of the police power for land use regulation purposes, and
it is a far more relaxed standard than the rational nexus test that most
courts currently apply to impact fees.3 4' The fact that many pre-Lingle
commentators and courts favored the more precise calculations of a rigorous rational nexus analysis for purely monetary exactions may, to some
extent, reflect the influence of the sweeping language of the Supreme
Court's Nollan and Dolan decisions in the context of land dedication ex-

345
346

See supra notes 279-84, 321-31 and accompanying text.

See supranotes 280-83 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.1.
8 See supra Part II.B.1.
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actions.3 49 This expansive reading of Nollan and Dolan is belied by the
Court's reasoning in Lingle."'0
As land use authorities and state courts begin to absorb the retrenchment of Nollan and Dolan as takings doctrine, they should also
reconsider whether a rigorous rational nexus analysis is the most
appropriate framework for validating developer fees that finance incentives for green design and construction practices and other sustainable
development programs. These fees are not traditional impact fees because they do not finance infrastructure costs attributable to new development.3 5' Rather, they are primarily economic instruments intended to
serve the public welfare by encouraging more sustainable development
practices. 2 The fundamental purpose of a green building incentive
program should be to provide market-based incentives to drive the real
estate industry to adopt sustainable design and construction practices.
Courts should view a land use program with that objective as a presumptively benign and valid exercise of the police power. Green building
programs financed through developer fees, especially those assessed
pursuant to a legislative scheme of general application, simply do not raise
the risk of improper opportunism that courts frequently suspect when
government requires the dedication of an interest in land as a condition
to development approval. 5 3 In particular, a program that uses green

...
See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 443-47 (Cal. 1996) (holding that
Nollan and Dolan applied to a recreational fee imposed as a discretionary permit condition); Haskins, supranote 169, at 488-91, 501-21 (arguing for a broad reading of Nollan
and Dolan and criticizing courts that have hesitated to apply a consistent takings analysis
to legislative as well as adjudicative exactions); Rosenberg, supranote 241, at 251-59 (discussing how state courts have applied the Nollan and Dolancases to monetary exactions).
But see Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek, Public Improvements and the Nexus
Factor:The Takings Equation after Dolan v. City of Tigard, in ExACTIONS, IMPACT FEES
AND DEDICATIONS: SHAPING LAND-USE DEVELOPMENT AND FUNDING INFRASTRUCTURE IN
THEDOLANERA 3, 11-13 (Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek eds., 1995) (arguing that
there is "a fairly compelling basis to narrowly interpret Dolan and limit its application
to exaction cases in which the property owner is required to dedicate land as a condition
of permit approval.').
350 See supra Part II.A.l.a.
351 Cf. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 85, at 509 ("[i]mpact fees are charges
levied by local governments on new developments in order to pay a proportionate share
of the capital costs of providing public infrastructure to those developments.").
352 See Kingsley, supra note 1, at 566-67.
...
See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (suggesting that the
government effectively extorts money when a connection between a development restriction's purpose and the condition imposed is lacking); Simpson v. North Platte, 292 N.W.2d
297, 301 (Neb. 1980).
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building feebates to marshal market forces in favor of sustainability
provides no basis to insist on heightened judicial scrutiny.
. In Holmdel Builders Association v. Township of Holmdel, 54 the
New Jersey Supreme Court offered an analysis that may, by analogy, point
the way to a more appropriate judicial response to sustainability fees. The
court held that the rational nexus standard applicable under New Jersey
law to impact fees was not appropriate to judge the validity of an affordable housing fee assessed against nonresidential projects 3 5 -- a social program that was far more controversial than any green building incentive
programs currently in evidence. Rather, the court subjected the affordable
housing fee programs to a far less demanding standard similar to the one
that courts traditionally apply when developers or landowners challenge
an exercise of the police power. 5 ' The court held that an affordable housing fee was one of several acceptable inclusionary zoning devices that could
help local governments meet their obligations under New Jersey law to
provide affordable housing.3 57 As such, the fee bore "a real and substantial
35
relationship to the regulation of land and the zoning power.""
The court rejected the argument that the fees were illegal because
they violated both prongs of the rational nexus test by requiring "developers to provide for off-site public needs that have not been caused by their
3 9 The court acknowledged
developments and furnish them no benefits.""
that it had "traditionally required a strong, almost but-for causal nexus
between off-site public facilities and private development in order to justify exactions."3" In language consistent with the deferential attitude that

...
Holmdel Builders Assoc. v. Twp. of Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277 (N.J. 1990).
355
Id. at 287-88. The case involved affordable housing fees assessed under several different
township programs devised to implement the landmark holdings of S. BurlingtonCounty
NAACP v. Mount Laurel Twp. (Mt. Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) and S. Burlington
County NAACP v. Mount Laurel Twp. (Mt. Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983), in which
the court recognized that New Jersey municipalities have an affirmative obligation to provide affordable housing. Holmdel, 583 A.2d at 279-80 (citing Mt. Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713;
Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390). A principal factor in the case was that all of the challenged
programs provided for nonresidential developers to pay affordable housing fees into trust
funds dedicated to the counties' Mt. Laurel obligations, even though some of the programs
also assessed fees against non-inclusionary residential projects. Holmdel, 583 A.2d at
280-83.
...
CompareHolmdel, 583 A.2d at 288 (describing the court's test), with supranotes 240-92
and accompanying text (describing the range ofjudicial treatment of developer challenges
to police power regulations).
357 Holmdel, 583 A.2d at 288.
358 Id. at 286 (citing Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 448).
359 Id. at 287-88.
3

6

Id. at 287.
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courts commonly use with reference to the police power in other circumstances,36 1 the court found "a sound basis to support a legislative judgment
that there is a reasonable relationship between unrestrained nonresidential development and the need for affordable residential development." 6' 2
Most importantly, the court declined to "equate such a reasonable relationship with the strict rational-nexus standard that demands a but-for causal
connection or direct consequential relationship between the private activity that gives rise to the exaction and the public activity to which it is
applied. 36 3 The court held that the governmental program involved was
"not analogous to specific off-site infrastructure improvements occasioned
by a particular development" and that the required reasonable relationship was "founded on the actual, albeit indirect and general, impact that
such nonresidential development has on both the need for lower-income
residential development and on the opportunity and capacity of municipalities to meet that need."3 In logic that could easily transfer to sustainability objectives, the court's reasonable relationship determination rested
in large part on an implicit recognition that private development uses
scarce natural capital.3 6 "[I] t is fair and reasonable to impose such fee requirements on private developers when they possess, enjoy, and consume
land, which constitutes the primary resource for housing. 3 66
The California Supreme Court has also used a reasonable relationship standard to uphold certain land use permitting fees. 36 7 The plaintiffs
applied for a conditional use permit to convert their existing project to
use as a tourist hotel. 36' The property had been used, at least at times
and to some extent, as a residential hotel for long-term residents.36 9 San
Francisco's Residential Hotel Unit Conversion and Demolition Ordinance
and the city's planning code required the plaintiffs to obtain a conditional
use permit.37 ° The city granted the permit but, in accordance with the
ordinance, conditioned the approval on a requirement that the plaintiffs

361
362

See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
Holmdel, 583 A.2d at 288.

363 Id.
364 Id.

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
361 San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 100-06 (Cal.
2002). Ironically, the California Supreme Court's decision in this case precluded the U.S.
Supreme Court from deciding the issue in the subsequent action that the plaintiffs brought
in federal court. See supranotes 217-22 and accompanying text.
..
369 San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 91.
Id. at 97.
370
Id. at 91-94.
361
31
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mitigate the loss of residential units attributable to the conversion. 371 The
ordinance allowed the plaintiffs either to replace units or to pay a mitigation fee in the amount of $567,000, as calculated by the Department of
Building Inspection in accordance with the provisions of the ordinance.3 72
The plaintiffs paid the fee and filed an action that challenged certain administrative determinations and that also asserted that the ordinance effected a taking under the California Constitution. 73 The court held that the
appropriate standard to apply was California's "reasonable relationship"
test rather than the heightened scrutiny standard that both California law
and the Nollan and Dolan cases require for certain exactions. 7 4
The court reasoned that heighten scrutiny is appropriate when a
land use authority demands a land dedication or when it imposes an ad hoc
condition that a developer must pay a fee that is not imposed on others. 5
But the less demanding "reasonable relationship" test should apply when
the exaction is a fee required under a legislative scheme generally applicable to all similarly situated projects.376 Because the San Francisco
ordinance did "not provide City staff or administrative bodies with any
discretion as to the imposition or size of a housing replacement fee," the
court did not perceive the "same potential for illegitimate leveraging of
private property" that justifies heightened scrutiny.3 77 The court held
that the same higher degree of scrutiny that applies under Nollan and
Dolan to land dedication exactions also should apply "to development
fees imposed on an individualized basis as a condition for development
....But a different standard of scrutiny would apply to development fees
that are generally applicable through legislative action . . . ."" Courts
and commentators sometimes characterize this distinction as one that
differentiates between an adjudicative exaction condition and a legislative one.379
371Id. at

91-92.
372 Id. at 95.
373

Id.

San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 105-06.
Id. at 101-03. The court relied both on the Nollan and Dolancases and on the related
California precedent established by SantaMonicaBeach, Ltd. v. SuperiorCourt, 968 P.2d
993 (Cal. 1999) and Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996). San Remo
Hotel, 41 P.3d at 101-03.
...
San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 103-05.
171
375

...
Id. at 102.
8
3

Id.at 103 (quoting Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 968 P.2d 993, 1001-02
(Cal. 1999)).
379 See, e.g., Haskins, supra note 169, at 488 (arguing that lower courts currently misapply
1
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Thus, both the New Jersey Supreme Court and the California
Supreme Court have held that different kinds of developer fee programs
require different standards. ° In neither case did the court use the de88
There was no
manding calculus of a rigorous rational nexus test.3
inquiry into baseline studies of the externalized costs involved and no
need for the court to assess a particularized determination of the developer's proportionate share of those costs. 38 2 While the New Jersey court
called for "a real and substantial relationship" to land use control 38 3 and
the California court used the more customary "reasonable relationship"
formula,3" both cases returned to the customary, flexible, and highly
deferential principle that reasonable land use regulations will normally
survive judicial scrutiny.38 A key benefit of this approach is that it
accommodates context-based distinctions in the land use policies of
different jurisdictions. A New Jersey township's method of implementing
that state's affordable housing policy,38 6 and San Francisco's program for
retaining residential hotel capacity,387 may not be appropriate or even
relevant for other communities. That, however, is not the issue. How to
frame and analyze the question in each instance is best committed to the
sound discretion of state policy, as determined by the legislative bodies
and courts of each state.
When there is no unconstitutional condition in the form of a land
grab, and no other peculiar need to guard against the specific risk of
governmental extortion or gimmickry, courts should be free to use a
the distinction between adjudicative and legislative decisions).
80 See supra notes 355-56, 374-78 and accompanying text.
381 See San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 105 (stating that the housing replacement fees in
question were not subject to the level of scrutiny required under Nollan v. Cal Costal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), and Ehrlich v.
City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996); Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Twp. of Holmdel,
583 A.2d 277, 288 (N.J. 1990) ("[The rational-nexus test is not apposite in determining
the validity.., of affordable-housing development fees...").
382
See San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 111 (noting that the "rough proportionality" standard
was inapplicable); Holmdel, 583 A.2d at 288 (refusing to require a "direct consequential
relationship" between the developer's private activity and the public use to which the
exaction was put).
383 Holmdel, 583 A.2d at 286.
" San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 105.
385 See supra Part II.B.1.

" See Holmdel, 583 A.2d at 280 (addressing an ordinance that imposed fees on developers,
to be placed in affordable-housing trust fund).
87 See San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 91-92 (addressing an ordinance that attempted to
minimize adverse effects of the loss of residential: hotel units).
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deferential standard to determine whether a developer fee program is
legal. It should be sufficient to require simply that sustainability fee
programs bear a reasonable relationship to the public health, safety, and
general welfare, which is the touchstone courts normally use to determine the legality of other exercises of the police power in the land use
context."' 8 There is no basis for a constitutionally mandated, nationwide,
rigorous rational nexus test in these instances. It would go too far to
speculate that this very consideration of contextual nuance motivated the
U.S. Supreme Court to preclude relitigation of the San Remo case in
federal court." 9 It is not too much, however, to suggest that it is wise to
leave it primarily to state courts to address "the complex factual, techni39
cal, and legal questions related to zoning and land-use regulations.""
Developer fees assessed to fund green building incentives should be
judged under the simple reasonable relationship test that courts use to determine the legality of most other land use regulations adopted pursuant
to the police power.3 9' Absent special considerations, such as those that
arise when government seeks to appropriate specific property (e.g., an easement or title to land), the traditional standard for judging the legality of an
exercise of the police power in the land use regulation context is, and should
remain, a highly deferential and generalized one.392 This is not to say that
all green building incentive programs are wise, or that any specific marketbased fee will be efficacious, but merely that courts should defer to a legislative judgment to adopt a particular green building incentive program
unless it is "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."39' 3
CONCLUSION: THE EFFECTIVE USE OF DEVELOPER FUNDING DEVICES
FOR SUSTAINABILITY

Given the prevailing view that environmental mitigation fees
should conform to a conventional rational nexus framework, a conservative
approach counsels land use authorities to structure their green building
38 See, e.g.,

Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (stating that the
court must find that an ordinance has no substantial connection to the "public health,
safety, morals [or] general welfare" before the court may find it unconstitutional) (citation
omitted).
389 See supra notes 217-22 and accompanying text.
" San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 347 (2005).
391 See supra notes 217-22 and accompanying text.
392 See supra notes 217-22 and accompanying text.
393 Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395 (1926) (citations omitted).
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and sustainable construction fee programs cautiously within the context
of comprehensive land use planning." That approach should be sufficient
to withstand the inevitable challenges that the development community
will mount whenever the fees involved are substantial. 9 5 But, some more
progressive jurisdictions may prefer a less formulaic tactic that aggressively uses a developer fee program as an economic instrument to create
a powerful incentive for developers to internalize social costs that threaten
sustainability in ways that are not easy to quantify. Such communities
must boldly challenge the authority of the rigorous rational nexus analysis for sustainability mitigation purposes, seeking to substitute a standard
more akin to the reasonable relationship standard that courts apply to
many other police power exercises in the land use context.39 6
Finally, it must be recognized that the exaction route is not the only
way to justify developer fees that finance green building programs. In those
jurisdictions that have, or can secure, the necessary taxing power, excise
taxes assessed against new development may prove to be an especially
effective means to finance progressive programs. 97 Alternatively, but again
subject to the possible need for express enabling legislation, development
agreements may provide an efficient mechanism for funding the social
costs of development while avoiding the most troublesome legal issues
that exactions raise.3 98

" See supra Part II.B.3.
...
See supra Part II.B.4.
396 See supra Part II.B.4.
97 Seesupranote 25 and accompanying text. While the legality of excise taxes in this context
is a topic for another day, one particularly interesting parallel exists with respect to challenges to developer fees in the form of excise taxes and challenges to land use exactions.
In both instances, a constitutional claim must overcome substantial hurdles both because
of the deference courts give to the legislative policy decisions involved and the jurisdictional
impediments to bringing a claim in federal court. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and
County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 347 (2005) (addressing land use exactions in the
form of conversion fees assessed against a hotel project); Home Builders Ass'n v. City of
Madison, 10 F. Supp. 2d 617,621-27 (1997) (applying the Federal Tax Injunction Act to bar
a challenge to impact fees to provide additional funding for typical municipal services).
398
See Callies & Sonoda, supranote 228, at 408 (explaining the advantages of providing
for infrastructure costs through development agreements).

